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I.  MERRILL’S METEOR: THE DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL COOPERATION 
Human attitudes toward nature are notoriously biased in favor of things that 
humans can perceive, admire, and exploit.1  Biodiversity preservation, for 
example, proceeds primarily on the assumption that conservation promises vast 
commercial benefits,2 even though “[t]he vast majority of endangered species 
probably will not cure cancer.”3  What human beings arrogantly call the “Age of 
Mammals” is more appropriately designated the “Age of Insects.”4  To overcome 
this bias, effective environmental protection demands that “[t]hose of us who love 
nature . . . think about saving ordinary places and ordinary things.”5 
As with nature, so with law.  In the 2002 Childress Lecture, Thomas W. 
Merrill makes a powerful case that judicial epochs in Supreme Court history 
should be measured according to criteria other than the tenure of individual Chief 
Justices.6  Professor Merrill is irrefutably correct in distinguishing the first eight 
Terms of the Rehnquist Court from that Court’s record since 1994.  As Professor 
Merrill demonstrates, the first eight Terms of the Rehnquist Court were 
characterized by fierce battles over high-profile social issues such as abortion, 
affirmative action, and public displays of religion.7  Many of these clashes ended 
in frustration for the Court’s conservative Justices.  The record of futility extends 
beyond the conservative catastrophe of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.8  Thanks to the Rehnquist Court’s failure to realign 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Lee v. Weisman,9 Lemon v. Kurtzman’s 
entanglement test10 survives like “[a] ghoul in a late-night horror movie that 
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed 
 
 1. See, e.g., EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 253 (1992) (“‘Human hunters help 
no species.’  That is a general truth and the key to the whole melancholy situation.”). 
 2. See generally Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on 
the Relationship Between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,625 
(2001). 
 3. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act—A 
Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the Coalmine, 27 
ENVTL. L. 845, 853 (1997). 
 4. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN AGENDA (1993). 
 5. Holly Doremus, The Special Importance of Ordinary Places, ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y J., Spring 2000, at 3, 4. 
 6. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2002). 
 7. See id. at 581-84. 
 8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 9. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 10. 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). 
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and buried.”11  Justice Scalia’s arrival on the Court, far from heralding a return to 
formalist approaches to the separation of powers, yielded solo dissents in 
Morrison v. Olson12 and Mistretta v. United States.13  Even in affirmative action 
cases, the conservative Justices have proved surprisingly ineffective.  Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,14 rather than the earlier decision in Croson15 or the 
later decision in Adarand,16 retains the distinction of being the only case in the 
Supreme Court’s body of constitutional decisions on affirmative action that 
commanded five votes for every word of its principal opinion.  Perhaps the most 
impressive feat of the early Rehnquist Court consisted of its consistently narrow 
interpretations of federal civil rights statutes.17  Congress erased that achievement 
when it overrode no fewer than eight Rehnquist Court decisions in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.18 
Since 1994, however, the Rehnquist Court has assembled a string of decisions 
that have considerably narrowed the scope of congressional authority and granted 
new legal immunities to the states.  Cases such as United States v. Lopez,19 City of 
Boerne v. Flores,20 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,21 Printz v. United 
States,22 and United States v. Morrison23 have “put a [multiple] whammy on 
 
 11. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., concurring); see also Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“I would grant certiorari in this case if only to take the 
opportunity to inter the Lemon test once for [sic] all.”).  See generally Russell L. Weaver, Like a 
Ghoul in a Late Night Horror Movie, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2003). 
 12. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 13. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 14. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 15. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 16. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 17. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. 
Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); 
Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 
900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 
U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also Library of Cong. v. 
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 
(1985).  But cf. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (extending the use of voluntary 
affirmative action plans, upheld as applied to workers of a minority race in United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), to women). 
 18. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; see Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 249-51 (1994).  For a list of the eight Rehnquist Court decisions and four 
Burger Court decisions (all cited supra in note 17) overridden by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE 
L.J. 331, 333 n.4 (1991). 
 19. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 20. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 21. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 22. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 23. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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congressional authority.”24  Thanks to the Rehnquist Court’s foray into the 
penumbras and emanations of the Eleventh Amendment,25 states now enjoy 
sovereign immunity against federal claims brought in their own courts26 and 
against federal administrative proceedings.27  Thurgood Marshall’s plaintive 
farewell to a Court he accused of adopting “[p]ower, not reason” as its currency 
came three Terms too early.28 
The Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudential record provides ample fodder for 
spirited discussion, and Professor Merrill’s commentators have done their best to 
engage the debate.  For his part, Professor Merrill is refreshingly resourceful in 
eschewing “ideational” analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence in favor of a 
relentlessly empirical approach.29  Three of the techniques he employs are 
prevalent throughout political scientists’ writings on the Supreme Court.  
Sophisticated political analysis of the Supreme Court begins with the attitudinal 
model30 and eventually embraces multiple hypotheses about strategic voting by 
the Justices in response to internal and external politics.31 
To this rich scholarly literature, Professor Merrill has made a unique 
contribution.  He argues that the Justices’ propensity to engage in cooperative 
behavior may stem from the stability or volatility of the Court’s personnel.  
When the Court’s membership is in flux, the Justices tend to behave like 
players in a one-shot or short-term game.  Multiple coalitions flourish, but 
none dominates and all tend to hedge their doctrinal bets against imminent 
changes in the Court’s personnel.  By contrast, when the same nine Justices 
convene across multiple Terms, the Court tends to reflect the strategy of a 
repeat game.  Dominant coalitions—few in number and stable in their 
 
 24. Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the 
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1722 (2002). 
 25. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289 (2001). 
 26. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 27. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 28. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 29. Merrill, supra note 6, at 571. 
 30. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); Saul Brenner & Robert H. Dorff, The Attitudinal Model and Fluidity 
Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Theoretical Perspective, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 195 
(1992); Robert H. Dorff & Saul Brenner, Conformity Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 54 
J. POL. 762 (1992); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision 
Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992); Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, Voting Fluidity 
and the Attitudinal Model of Supreme Court Decision Making, 44 W. POL. Q. 119 (1991). 
 31. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); 
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. 
Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999); Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511 (1998) 
(reviewing EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of 
Federalism: An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 741 (2000). 
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composition—feel much freer to fashion doctrinal innovations.  “[S]omething 
as simple as . . . judicial longevity,” he concludes, “may have fateful 
consequences.”32 
 What Professor Merrill calls the “second Rehnquist Court” boasts one of 
the most stable collections of Justices in history: since the beginning of the 
1994 Term, the same nine Justices have served eight consecutive Terms.  In 
our most recent study of voting behavior on the Supreme Court, Paul H. 
Edelman and I took note of the current Court’s almost unprecedented 
stability.33  We relied on this stability in using the voting record of the Court 
since 1994 to develop our model of voting power among the Justices.  It never 
occurred to Professor Edelman or to me that the very stability we touted as 
validating our model might provide an independent explanation for voting 
behavior on the Supreme Court. 
 I beg the reader’s indulgence as I draw another analogy to nature and 
natural history.  Professor Merrill’s insight is reminiscent of the recent 
controversy over the causes of the Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T) extinction, more 
popularly known as the twilight of the age of dinosaurs.  The father-and-son 
team of Luis and Walter Alvarez found a rich layer of iridium in numerous 
sites that marked the boundary between the Cretaceous and Tertiary periods of 
geological history.  The substantial accumulation of iridium, a platinum group 
metal that is scarce on earth but abundant in extraterrestrial objects, suggested 
that a meteor strike triggered the spectacular loss of species 65 million years 
ago at the close of the Cretaceous.34  Though hotly disputed when it was first 
propounded in 1980, the Alvarezes’s “impact theory” of K-T extinctions has 
won widespread acceptance.35 
 An even more dramatic extension of the impact theory remains the subject 
of fierce debate.  If extraterrestrial phenomena precipitated one mass extinction 
event, might they have caused others? These events might even lend 
themselves to prediction, for asteroids, meteors, and comets, like planets, 
follow cyclical timetables.  One line of statistical analysis suggests that peaks 
 
 32. Merrill, supra note 6, at 651. 
 33. See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting the 
Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MINN. L. REV. 131, 134-35 (2001). 
 34. See WALTER ALVAREZ, T. REX AND THE CRATER OF DOOM (1997); Luis W. Alvarez et al., 
Extraterrestrial Cause for the Cretaceous-Tertiary Extinction, 208 SCI. 1095 (1980); see also 
GEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF IMPACTS OF LARGE ASTEROIDS AND COMETS ON THE EARTH 
(Leon T. Silver & Peter H. Schultz eds., 1982). 
 35. See, e.g., JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CRETACEOUS: DINOSAUR 
EXTINCTION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN GEOLOGY 221 (1998) (“As even its bitterest 
opponents have to admit, the Alvarez theory has brought geology not only a new set of questions, 
but also a greatly improved set of sampling techniques and analytical methods for answering 
them. . . .  These are the hallmarks of a fertile theory.”); Michael E. Williams, Catastrophic Versus 
Noncatastrophic Extinction of the Dinosaurs: Testing, Falsifiability, and the Burden of Proof, 68 J. 
PALEONTOLOGY 183 (1994). 
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in the extinction rate of marine invertebrates recur in 26- to 30-million-year 
intervals.36  The most aggressive proponents of periodicity have argued that the 
26-million-year clock depends on Nemesis, our sun’s as yet undetected 
companion star, whose eccentric orbit through the Oort cloud periodically 
hurls comets toward earth.37  A competing school of thought dismisses the 
apparent periodicity of extinction events as a mere statistical anomaly.38 
 My purpose in describing the periodicity controversy is not to take sides in 
a debate in which I claim no expertise and possess even less.  Rather, I wish 
merely to suggest that experts in law and in political science might emulate 
those natural scientists who have methodically explored possible 
extraterrestrial causes for mass extinctions besides the K-T event.  Recent 
research, for instance, has sought an extraterrestrial explanation for the 
decimation of species at the close of the Permian period,39 the great-
grandmother of all extinction spasms.40  Legal scholars and political scientists 
have no less an obligation to pursue promising pathways toward new 
knowledge.  When a highly regarded scholar propounds a novel, attractive 
hypothesis about judicial behavior, his peers have only one duty—to lay that 
hypothesis beside all available evidence and to decide whether the latter 
supports the former.41  Or to put it in livelier, Pulitzer Prize-winning language, 
 
 36. See David M. Raup & J. John Sepkoski, Jr., Periodicity of Extinctions in the Geologic Past, 
81 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 801 (1984); David M. Raup & J. John Sepkoski, Jr., Periodic 
Extinction of Families and Genera, 231 SCI. 833 (1986). 
 37. See Marc Davis, Piet Hut & Richard A. Muller, Extinction of Species by Periodic Comet 
Showers, 308 NATURE 715 (1984). 
 38. See Antoni Hoffman, Patterns of Family Extinction Depend on Definition and Geological 
Timescale, 315 NATURE 659 (1985); Richard A. Kerr, Periodic Extinctions and Impacts Challenged, 
227 SCI. 1451 (1985).  For entertaining accounts of the scientific fury over the impact theory and the 
periodicity debate, see RICHARD FORTEY, LIFE: A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE FIRST FOUR BILLION 
YEARS OF LIFE ON EARTH 257-58 (1997); CHARLES OFFICER & JAKE PAGE, THE GREAT DINOSAUR 
EXTINCTION CONTROVERSY (1996); DAVID M. RAUP, THE NEMESIS AFFAIR: A STORY OF THE 
DEATH OF DINOSAURS AND THE WAYS OF SCIENCE (1986). 
 39. See Luann Becker et al., Impact Event at the Permian-Triassic Boundary: Evidence from 
Extraterrestrial Noble Gases in Fullerenes, 291 SCI. 1530 (2001). 
 40. See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL 
HISTORY 134 (1977) (describing the “great dying” of marine organisms “[a]bout 225 million years 
ago, at the end of the Permian period,” as “the most profound of several mass extinctions that have 
punctuated the evolution of life”); David M. Raup, Diversity Crises in the Geological Past, in 
BIODIVERSITY 51, 52 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988) (noting how the world of higher organisms at the end 
of the Permian period had “an extremely close brush with total destruction”).  See generally D.H. 
Erwin, The End-Permian Mass Extinction, 21 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 69 (1990). 
 41. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (“When an act of Congress is 
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial 
branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked 
beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former.”). 
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“it pisses God off if you walk by the color purple in a field somewhere and 
don’t notice it.”42 
 If the stable membership of the Rehnquist Court since 1994 at least 
partially explains the prevalence of a dominant coalition making bold legal 
innovations, we should expect comparable doctrinal foment during other 
periods of stability among the Justices.43  Series of Terms characterized by 
rapid turnover in the Supreme Court’s membership should similarly reflect the 
sort of behavior that typifies participants in a short-term game: the emergence 
of a wider range of coalitions who are more tentative and more open to 
institutional change than their counterparts on a stable Court.44  Indeed, the 
validity of Professor Merrill’s hypothesis practically depends on its 
verifiability in periods besides the “second” Rehnquist Court.  Without 
historical validation, the Court’s recent record provides little basis for drawing 
generalizations about Supreme Court behavior.  When the appropriate time 
horizon stretches beyond two centuries, “a question posed on a scale of a mere 
[eight] years is likely to produce aberrant answers.”45 
 Like the detection of mass extinctions in geological history, testing 
“Merrill’s Meteor” is a straightforward exercise in statistics.  We need only to 
decide what to count and what to compare.  I assume that most legal scholars 
are more familiar with shifts in the Court’s case law than with changes in the 
Court’s membership.  Most constitutional law scholars presumably know the 
“fossil record” of the Supreme Court’s decisions, as preserved in United States 
Reports, better than the fossil record of the Court’s institutional history, as 
reflected in turnover among the Justices.  Except those scholars with deep 
historical or biographical expertise, few know the precise progression of the 
Justices who have served on the highest court in the land. 
 The first step in testing Professor Merrill’s cooperative behavior 
hypothesis, therefore, lies in determining the precise degree of relative stability 
and volatility in personnel over the course of the Supreme Court’s history.  
Part II of this article develops an initial, rudimentary measure of volatility.  I 
take the simple expedient of measuring gaps between Supreme Court 
appointments. The longer the gap (all other things being equal), the more 
 
 42. ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE 191 (1982). 
 43. If Professor Merrill’s hypothesis is correct, it should also be verifiable through a study of 
other multimember, deliberative institutions.  I leave for another time, and in all likelihood another 
scholar, the task of applying Professor Merrill’s ideas to institutions such as the federal courts of 
appeals, state courts of last resort, or even legislatures. 
 44. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 649 (“A Court in flux is less likely to achieve [a cooperative] 
equilibrium because the introduction of new players disrupts the expectations and strategies of the 
other players, requiring in effect that the game start over.”).  See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. 
PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994). 
 45. David Christian, The Case for “Big History,” 2 J. WORLD HIST. 223, 229 (1991). 
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stable the population of Justices. 
 Part III develops a more complex measure of stability and volatility.  
Although I retain the turnover rate among the Justices as my primary measure 
of volatility, I also incorporate a four-year running average of Supreme Court 
appointments and make modest adjustments for all appointments of Chief 
Justices.  Both measures of volatility demonstrate that the current Court is one 
of the most stable collections of Justices in history.  Only the last decade of the 
Burger Court and, perhaps, the end of the Fuller Court come close.  At the 
other extreme, global depression and world war during the twentieth century 
corresponded with extreme volatility on the Supreme Court.  An initial glance, 
utterly uninformed by empirical measures of doctrinal volatility, suggests that 
Professor Merrill’s cooperative behavior hypothesis provides, at best, a partial 
explanation for the Court’s decisional record.  On one hand, the late Fuller 
Court (which, like the second Rehnquist Court, was a Court of relatively stable 
composition) is known for bold doctrinal developments in response to 
economic regulation.  On the other hand, the New Deal Court that unraveled 
much of the Lochnerian legal tradition exhibited a similar facility for crafting 
novel constitutional doctrines (albeit in service of different political ends), 
even though the membership of that Court was one of the most volatile in 
history. 
 To determine whether long periods of stability in Supreme Court personnel 
correspond with bold doctrinal development, Part IV applies three separate 
tests of doctrinal innovation: (1) the propensity of a Court to render 
“influential” decisions during particular Terms, (2) the influence of a Term’s 
work as a whole based on subsequent citations, and (3) the number of 
overruling decisions rendered during any given Term.  These admittedly 
imperfect tests provide little support for Professor Merrill’s hypothesis.  If 
anything, both citations and “overrulings” suggest that the arrival of new 
Justices tends to spur rather than retard doctrinal movement.  To the extent that 
stable membership does enhance the Supreme Court’s marginal propensity to 
cut new doctrinal ground, that tendency apparently imparts less influence than 
other factors.  As I conclude in Part V, this preliminary look at the historical 
record suggests that judicial behavior, like all other complex phenomena, 
depends on numerous variables whose interdependence eludes easy detection. 
II.  THE TIME LINE OF THE JUSTICES 
 I begin with a straightforward table of Supreme Court appointments, 
adding only those enhancements needed to highlight temporal gaps between 
appointments: 
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TABLE 1 
 
Supreme Court Appointments over Time 
 
     Multiples 
 Appointing  Date of Interval in of average 
Justice President Type appointment days interval 
 
Jay Washington CJ 19-Oct-1789 n/a n/a 
Rutledge Washington A 15-Feb-1790 119 . 
Cushing Washington A 02-Feb-1790 -13 . 
Wilson Washington A 05-Oct-1789 -120 . 
Blair Washington A 02-Feb-1790 120 . 
Iredell Washington A 12-May-1790 99 . 
Johnson Washington A 06-Aug-1792 817 + 
Paterson Washington A 11-Mar-1793 217 . 
Rutledge Washington CJ 12-Aug-1795 884 + 
Chase Washington A 04-Feb-1796 176 . 
Washington Adams A 04-Feb-1799 1096 + 
Moore Adams A 21-Apr-1800 441 . 
Marshall Adams CJ 04-Feb-1801 289 . 
Johnson Jefferson A 07-May-1804 1188 + 
Livingston Jefferson A 20-Jan-1807 988 + 
Todd Jefferson A 04-May-1807 104 . 
Duvall Madison A 23-Nov-1811 1664 ++ 
Story Madison A 03-Feb-1812 72 . 
Thompson Monroe A 01-Sep-1823 4228 ++++++ 
Trimble J.Q. Adams A 16-Jun-1826 1019 + 
McLean Jackson A 16-Jun-1826 0 . 
Baldwin Jackson A 18-Jan-1830 1312 + 
Wayne Jackson A 14-Jan-1835 1822 ++ 
Taney Jackson CJ 28-Mar-1836 439 . 
Barbour Jackson A 12-May-1836 45 . 
Catron Van Buren A 01-May-1837 354 . 
McKinley Van Buren A 09-Jan-1838 253 . 
Daniel Van Buren A 10-Jan-1842 1462 ++ 
Nelson Tyler A 27-Feb-1845 1144 + 
Woodbury Polk A 23-Sep-1845 208 . 
Grier Polk A 10-Aug-1846 321 . 
Curtis Fillmore A 10-Oct-1851 1887 ++ 
Campbell Pierce A 11-Apr-1853 549 . 
Clifford Buchanan A 21-Jan-1858 1746 ++ 
Swayne Lincoln A 27-Jan-1862 1467 ++ 
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Miller Lincoln A 21-Jul-1862 175 . 
Davis Lincoln A 10-Dec-1862 142 . 
Field Lincoln A 20-May-1863 161 . 
Chase Lincoln CJ 15-Dec-1864 575 . 
Strong Grant A 14-Mar-1870 1915 ++ 
Bradley Grant A 23-Mar-1870 9 . 
Hunt Grant A 09-Jan-1873 1023 + 
Waite Grant CJ 04-Mar-1874 419 . 
Harlan Hayes A 10-Dec-1877 1377 + 
Woods Hayes A 05-Jan-1881 1122 + 
Matthews Garfield A 17-May-1881 132 . 
Gray Arthur A 09-Jan-1882 237 . 
Blatchford Arthur A 03-Apr-1882 84 . 
Lamar Cleveland A 18-Jan-1888 2116 +++ 
Fuller Cleveland CJ 08-Oct-1888 264 . 
Brewer Harrison A 06-Jan-1890 455 . 
Brown Harrison A 05-Jan-1891 364 . 
Shiras Harrison A 10-Oct-1892 644 . 
Jackson Harrison A 04-Mar-1893 145 . 
White Cleveland A 12-Mar-1894 373 . 
Peckham Cleveland A 06-Jan-1896 665 . 
McKenna McKinley A 26-Jan-1898 751 + 
Holmes Roosevelt A 08-Dec-1902 1776 ++ 
Day Roosevelt A 02-Mar-1903 84 . 
Moody Roosevelt A 17-Dec-1906 1386 + 
Lurton Taft A 03-Jan-1910 1113 + 
Hughes Taft A 10-Oct-1910 280 . 
White Taft CJ 19-Dec-1910 70 . 
VanDevanter Taft A 03-Jan-1911 15 . 
Lamar Taft A 03-Jan-1911 0 . 
Pitney Taft A 18-Mar-1912 440 . 
McReynolds Wilson A 12-Oct-1914 938 + 
Brandeis Wilson A 05-Jun-1916 602 . 
Clarke Wilson A 09-Oct-1916 126 . 
Taft Harding CJ 11-Jul-1921 1736 ++ 
Sutherland Harding A 02-Oct-1922 448 . 
Butler Harding A 02-Jan-1923 92 . 
Sanford Harding A 19-Feb-1923 48 . 
Stone Coolidge A 02-Mar-1925 742 + 
Hughes Hoover CJ 24-Feb-1930 1820 ++ 
Roberts Hoover A 02-Jun-1930 98 . 
Cardozo Hoover A 14-Mar-1932 651 . 
Black Roosevelt A 19-Aug-1937 1984 ++ 
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Reed Roosevelt A 31-Jan-1938 165 . 
Frankfurter Roosevelt A 30-Jan-1939 364 . 
Douglas Roosevelt A 17-Apr-1939 77 . 
Murphy Roosevelt A 05-Feb-1940 294 . 
Stone Roosevelt CJ 03-Jul-1941 514 . 
Byrnes Roosevelt A 08-Jul-1941 5 . 
Jackson Roosevelt A 11-Jul-1941 3 . 
Rutledge Roosevelt A 5-Feb-1943 584 . 
Burton Truman A 01-Oct-1945 959 + 
Vinson Truman CJ 24-Jun-1946 266 . 
Clark Truman A 24-Aug-1949 1157 + 
Minton Truman A 12-Oct-1949 49 . 
Warren Eisenhower CJ 05-Oct-1953 1454 ++ 
Harlan Eisenhower A 28-Mar-1955 539 . 
Brennan Eisenhower A 16-Oct-1956 568 . 
Whittaker Eisenhower A 25-Mar-1957 160 . 
Stewart Eisenhower A 14-Oct-1958 568 . 
White Kennedy A 16-Apr-1962 1280 + 
Goldberg Kennedy A 01-Oct-1962 168 . 
Fortas Johnson A 04-Oct-1965 1099 + 
Marshall Johnson A 02-Oct-1967 728 + 
Burger Nixon CJ 23-Jun-1969 630 . 
Blackmun Nixon A 09-Jun-1970 351 . 
Powell Nixon A 07-Jan-1972 577 . 
Rehnquist Nixon A 07-Jan-1972 0 . 
Stevens Ford A 19-Dec-1975 1442 ++ 
O’Connor Reagan A 25-Sep-1981 2107 +++ 
Rehnquist Reagan CJ 26-Sep-1986 1827 ++ 
Scalia Reagan A 26-Sep-1986 0 . 
Kennedy Reagan A 18-Feb-1988 510 . 
Souter Bush A 09-Oct-1990 964 + 
Thomas Bush A 23-Oct-1991 379 . 
Ginsburg Clinton A 10-Aug-1993 657 . 
Breyer Clinton A 03-Aug-1994 358 . 
Now   24-Jul-2002 2912 ++++ 
 
Average    694 
Standard deviation   709 
Congressional session   730 
Presidential term   1461 
Senatorial term   2191 
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There have been 112 Supreme Court appointments in United States 
history.  Sixteen of those involved Chief Justices; the other ninety-six 
appointees served as Associate Justices.  The average interval between 
appointments is 694 days.  This interval is practically equivalent to two 
years—95% of 730 days, to be almost exact.  In other words, the Supreme 
Court welcomes a new Justice on a schedule comparable to the arrival of new 
Representatives in the United States Congress.  Indeed, the two measures are 
identical once we eliminate the double-counting of the five Chief Justices who 
also served as Associate Justices.  The sitting Congress is America’s 107th; 
Justice Breyer is the 107th individual to sit on the Supreme Court. 
The first five columns of Table 1 should be self-explanatory.  The sixth 
column provides a primitive bar chart.  It reports the gap between Supreme Court 
appointments in multiples of the average 694-day interval.  A mathematical purist 
might prefer multiples of the standard deviation beyond the mean, but the 
standard deviation of 709 is so close to the mean that I opted to omit this extra 
element of complexity.  Only thirty-seven intervals between Supreme Court 
appointments have matched or exceeded the 694-day benchmark.  The sixth 
column of Table 1 reports these intervals.  I have used plus signs to indicate the 
number of multiples so that larger numbers have a greater visual impact.  The 
greater the number of plus signs, the more noteworthy the gap between Supreme 
Court appointments. 
It should come as no surprise that Jimmy Carter was the only President  to 
serve a full four-year term without appointing a Supreme Court Justice.  Only 
sixteen times have a full four years intervened between Supreme Court 
appointments.  Of those instances, only four have exceeded the average wait 
between new Justices by a factor equal to or greater than three: 
 
· The thirteen-year gap between Justices Joseph Story and Smith Thompson 
(1812-23). 
· The six-year gap between Justices Samuel Blatchford and Lucius Q.C. 
Lamar (1882-88). 
· The six-year gap between Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day 
O’Connor (1975-81). 
· The ongoing eight-year interval since the appointment of Justice Stephen 
Breyer. 
 
The sixth and final column in Table 1 indicates these gaps with three or more 
concatenated plus signs.  Though no greater (so far) in their temporal magnitude 
than their nineteenth century precedents, the two modern gaps have had arguably 
greater political impact.  Neither the Story-Thompson gap nor the Blatchford-
Lamar gap traversed an entire presidency.  Although the Story-Thompson gap 
was the longest ever, President Monroe was able to make a Supreme Court 
appointment toward the end of his second term.  In any event, the Monroe 
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administration—so tranquil as to be remembered as “The Era of Good Feelings” 
in American history46—did not represent a significant political change from the 
preceding presidency of James Madison.  Lucius Q.C. Lamar joined the Supreme 
Court as a Democrat and a Southerner when neither trait had enjoyed great 
political currency on the national scene for a generation,47 but his appointment 
(especially when coupled with that of Chief Justice Melville Fuller) enabled 
Grover Cleveland, the first Democratic President in twenty-four years, to leave 
his imprint on the Court.  By contrast, the six-year wait for Sandra Day O’Connor 
skipped the only Democratic presidential administration from 1969 through 1993 
and ultimately enabled Republican Presidents, from Richard Nixon and Gerald 
Ford through Ronald Reagan and the elder George Bush, to make eleven 
consecutive Supreme Court appointments from 1969 to 1991.  The intense 
politicization of the high court in modern times, culminating in the Supreme 
Court’s dramatic intervention in presidential politics through Bush v. Gore,48 has 
magnified the significance of the continuing wait for the next Justice after 
Stephen Breyer. 
Of the twelve other gaps approaching, matching, or exceeding four years, 
several merit honorable mention.  Five years and three months passed between 
President Lincoln’s appointment of Chief Justice Salmon Chase in 1864 and 
President Grant’s appointment of Justice William Strong in 1870.  The 
Reconstruction Congress so despised President Andrew Johnson that it contracted 
the Supreme Court in 1866 from ten to six Justices.  Three of the most prominent 
Supreme Court appointments during the early twentieth century—those of Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Chief Justice William Howard Taft, and Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes—occurred after intervals of almost exactly five years after 
the preceding appointment.  Before he could appoint Hugo Black, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt marked the excruciating 1,984 days that had passed since 
President Hoover’s preceding appointment of Benjamin Cardozo.  Finally, the 
gap between Sherman Minton and Earl Warren—exactly one week shy of four 
years—is noteworthy if only because of the impact of Warren’s momentous 
arrival on Brown v. Board of Education,49 which is immodestly, but justifiably, 
described as “the most important decision in the history of the Court.”50 
 
 46. See generally HENRY AMMON, JAMES MONROE: THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY 
(1971). 
 47. See generally JAMES B. MURPHY, L.Q.C. LAMAR: PRAGMATIC PATRIOT (1973). 
 48. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 49. 347 U.S 483 (1954). 
 50. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 286 (1993) (quoting Justice 
Stanley Reed).  See generally Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking 
in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 34-44 (1979) (describing Warren’s role in 
securing unanimity in Brown); S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 
689 (1971). 
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The current Court’s stability is nothing short of extraordinary.  Even if we 
confine ourselves to strictly quantitative criteria and omit (at least momentarily) 
any political or other subjective considerations, it is hard to overstate the 
magnitude of the post-Breyer gap.  Between September 26, 1986, when Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were appointed, and August 3, 1994, when 
Justice Breyer took his seat, 2,868 days elapsed.  During that span, seven seats on 
the Court changed hands (or six, if one disregards Rehnquist’s promotion and 
treats Antonin Scalia as a de facto replacement for the retiring Warren Burger).  
On June 10, 2002, 2,868 days passed since Justice Breyer’s appointment.  On 
October 20, 2002, soon after the beginning of October Term 2002, that interval 
reached a round 3,000 days.  To put 3,000 days in perspective, consider that two 
presidential terms total 2,922 days.  Lou Gehrig played 2,130 consecutive games 
to earn his place in sports history as baseball’s Iron Horse; to displace Gehrig, Cal 
Ripken, Jr., played 2,632 games in a row.  For those who disdain baseball as “a 
game with increasingly heightened anticipation of increasingly limited action,”51 
other historical analogues abound.  For example, from the German invasion of 
Poland on September 1, 1939, to unconditional Japanese surrender on August 14, 
1945, World War II totaled 2,174 days. 
Table 1, nevertheless, falls short in two significant respects.  First, although 
the primitive bar chart in the final column identifies gaps noteworthy for their 
length, it provides little to no assistance in highlighting periods of rapid turnover.  
Professor Merrill’s description of “repeat game” conditions on the Rehnquist 
Court since 1994 has an important corollary.  When new Justices flood the Court, 
coalitions should become more fluid, and doctrinal innovations should become 
scarcer and more cautious.  Perceptions of stability or volatility fluctuate over 
time.  Recent turnover surely affects the Justices’ perceptions and expectations, 
even during a Term experiencing no change in personnel.  In treating Supreme 
Court appointments as a “Bayesian process,” Professor Merrill agrees as much.52  
The failure to account for change over any time frame besides a single Term 
constitutes Table 1’s second significant shortcoming. 
I, therefore, turn to the development of a quantitative measure that addresses 
these concerns. 
III.  SUBJECTING THE FOSSIL RECORD TO GREATER MATHEMATICAL RIGOR 
A. Chaotic Justice 
Despite its shortcomings, Table 1 provides all the information needed to 
measure volatility as well as stasis in Supreme Court membership and to gauge its 
fluctuation over periods greater than a single Term.  We can accomplish this 
 
 51. JOHN IRVING, A PRAYER FOR OWEN MEANY 38 (1989). 
 52. Merrill, supra note 6, at 645 & n.286. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] JUDICIAL EPOCHS IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 691 
transformation with minimal mathematics.53  Table 2 reorganizes the record of 
appointments according to Supreme Court Terms.  For the sake of convenience, I 
have redefined all Supreme Court Terms as beginning on October 1 and ending 
on September 30.  Column 2, labeled “Turnover,” records the number of new 
appointments taking place in each Term.  Tracking turnover among Justices in 
this fashion assigns a single measure for both volatility and stability in the Court’s 
membership. 
Column 3 measures the lingering effect of recent appointments.  It reports the 
rolling average of appointments during the four Terms preceding the current 
Term.  (Terms from 1789 through 1792 necessarily reflect a shorter period, or 
none at all.)  Table 2 relies upon a four-year time horizon merely because the 
length of a presidential term is the closest thing to a temporal gold standard in the 
nation’s capital.54  The rolling average discounts the impact of appointments on a 
straight-line basis; an appointment two Terms removed has three-quarters the 
impact of an appointment in the Term immediately before the Term in question.  
Appointments from three Terms before the test year receive half weight; 
appointments at the edge of the four-year time horizon are given only one-quarter 
the weight of a recent appointment. 
Column 4 adds a single point for the appointment of a Chief Justice in any 
given Term.  As Professor Merrill acknowledges in identifying the arrival of a 
new Chief Justice as a leading impetus for “norm change” within the Court,55 the 
appointment of a new Chief Justice is likelier than the appointment of an 
Associate Justice to destabilize coalitions and other working relationships on the 
Court.  Because directly adjusting the measure of turnover in column 2 would 
affect the four-year rolling average reported in column 3, column 4 employs a 
separate variable to account for the introduction of a Chief Justice without 
overstating the impact of that phenomenon. 
Finally, column 5 combines the results reported in columns 2, 3, and 4 
through simple addition into a single figure labeled “Chaos.”  The greater this 
number, the more volatile the state of personnel on the Supreme Court during a 
particular Term.  For ease of viewing, column 6 reports the value of 2 raised to 
the power of the volatility measure, “Chaos.”  The graph following Table 2 
projects the values reported in column 6 from 1790 through the present.  Its 
resemblance to the readout of a mass spectrometer is quite satisfying in light of 
 
 53. And in so doing we can avoid performing “elaborate mathematics” that might be “both 
unnecessary . . . and explicitly based on assumptions that are inappropriate to the question” before 
us.  Lynn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search for 
the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 190 (1996). 
 54. At least since the Supreme Court decided the so-called “Gold Clause Cases.”  See Perry v. 
United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Norman v. Balt. & 
Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
 55. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 639. 
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Stability and Volatility in Supreme Court Membership 
 
Term Turnover 4-yr avg Chief? Chaos 2^Chaos 
1789 6 0.00 1 7.00 128.00 
1790 0 6.00 0 6.00 64.00 
1791 1 2.57 0 3.57 11.89 
1792 1 1.78 0 2.78 6.86 
1793 0 1.30 0 1.30 2.46 
1794 1 0.50 1 2.50 5.66 
1795 1 0.70 0 1.70 3.25 
1796 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1797 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1798 1 0.30 0 1.30 2.46 
1799 1 0.50 0 1.50 2.83 
1800 1 0.70 1 2.70 6.50 
1801 0 0.90 0 0.90 1.87 
1802 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1803 1 0.30 0 1.50 2.83 
1804 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1805 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1806 2 0.20 0 2.20 4.59 
1807 0 0.90 0 0.90 1.87 
1808 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1809 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1810 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1811 2 0.00 0 2.00 4.00 
1812 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1813 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1814 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1815 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1816 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1817 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1818 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1819 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1820 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1821 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1822 1 0.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1823 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
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1824 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1825 1 0.20 0 1.20 2.30 
1826 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1827 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1828 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1829 2 0.10 0 2.10 4.29 
1830 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1831 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1832 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1833 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1834 1 0.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1835 2 0.40 1 3.40 10.56 
1836 1 1.10 0 2.10 4.29 
1837 1 1.20 0 2.20 4.59 
1838 0 1.20 0 1.20 2.30 
1839 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1840 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1841 1 0.10 0 1.10 2.14 
1842 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1843 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1844 2 0.20 0 2.20 4.59 
1845 1 0.90 0 1.90 3.73 
1846 0 1.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1847 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1848 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1849 0 0.10 0 0.10 1.07 
1850 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1851 1 0.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1852 1 0.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1853 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1854 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1855 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1856 0 0.10 0 0.10 1.07 
1857 1 0.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1858 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1859 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1860 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1861 2 0.10 0 2.10 4.29 
1862 2 0.80 0 2.80 6.96 
1863 0 1.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1864 1 1.00 1 3.00 8.00 
1865 0 1.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1866 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
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1867 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1868 0 0.10 0 0.10 1.07 
1869 2 0.00 0 2.00 4.00 
1870 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1871 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1872 1 0.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1873 1 0.60 1 2.60 6.06 
1874 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1875 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1876 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1877 1 0.10 0 1.10 2.14 
1878 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1879 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1880 2 0.20 0 2.20 4.59 
1881 2 0.90 0 2.90 7.46 
1882 0 1.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1883 0 1.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1884 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1885 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1886 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1887 1 0.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1888 1 0.40 1 2.40 5.28 
1889 1 0.70 0 1.70 3.25 
1890 1 0.90 0 1.90 3.73 
1891 0 1.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1892 2 0.60 0 2.60 6.06 
1893 1 1.10 0 2.10 4.29 
1894 0 1.10 0 1.10 2.14 
1895 1 0.70 0 1.70 3.25 
1896 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1897 1 0.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1898 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1899 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1900 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1901 1 0.10 0 1.10 2.14 
1902 1 0.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1903 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1904 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1905 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1906 1 0.10 0 1.10 2.14 
1907 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1908 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1909 1 0.20 0 1.20 2.30 
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1910 4 0.50 1 5.50 45.25 
1911 1 1.90 0 2.90 7.46 
1912 0 1.80 0 1.80 3.48 
1913 0 1.20 0 1.20 2.30 
1914 1 0.60 0 1.60 3.03 
1915 1 0.50 0 1.50 2.83 
1916 1 0.70 0 1.70 3.25 
1917 0 0.90 0 0.90 1.87 
1918 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1919 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1920 1 0.10 1 2.10 4.29 
1921 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1922 3 0.30 0 3.30 9.85 
1923 0 1.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1924 1 1.00 0 2.00 4.00 
1925 0 1.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1926 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1927 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1928 0 0.10 0 0.10 1.07 
1929 2 0.00 1 3.00 8.00 
1930 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1931 1 0.60 0 1.60 3.03 
1932 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1933 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1934 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1935 0 0.10 0 0.10 1.07 
1936 1 0.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1937 1 0.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1938 2 0.70 0 2.70 6.50 
1939 1 1.30 0 2.30 4.92 
1940 3 1.30 1 5.30 39.40 
1941 0 2.00 0 2.00 4.00 
1942 1 1.30 0 2.30 4.92 
1943 0 1.10 0 1.10 2.14 
1944 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1945 2 0.20 1 3.20 9.19 
1946 0 0.90 0 0.90 1.87 
1947 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
1948 1 0.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1949 1 0.60 0 1.60 3.03 
1950 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1951 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1952 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
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1953 1 0.10 1 2.10 4.29 
1954 1 0.40 0 1.40 2.64 
1955 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1956 2 0.50 0 2.50 5.66 
1957 0 1.10 0 1.10 2.14 
1958 1 0.70 0 1.70 3.25 
1959 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1960 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1961 1 0.20 0 1.20 2.30 
1962 1 0.50 0 1.50 2.83 
1963 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1964 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1965 1 0.30 0 1.30 2.46 
1966 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1967 1 0.30 0 1.30 2.46 
1968 1 0.60 1 2.60 6.06 
1969 1 0.80 0 1.80 3.48 
1970 0 0.90 0 0.90 1.87 
1971 2 0.60 0 2.60 6.06 
1972 0 1.10 0 1.10 2.14 
1973 0 0.70 0 0.70 1.62 
1974 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1975 1 0.20 0 1.20 2.30 
1976 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1977 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1978 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1979 0 0.10 0 0.10 1.07 
1980 1 0.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1981 0 0.40 0 0.40 1.32 
1982 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1983 0 0.20 0 0.20 1.15 
1984 0 0.10 0 0.10 1.07 
1985 2 0.00 1 3.00 8.00 
1986 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1987 1 0.60 0 1.60 3.03 
1988 0 0.80 0 0.80 1.74 
1989 0 0.50 0 0.50 1.41 
1990 1 0.20 0 1.20 2.30 
1991 1 0.50 0 1.50 2.83 
1992 1 0.70 0 1.70 3.25 
1993 1 0.90 0 1.90 3.73 
1994 0 1.00 0 1.00 2.00 
1995 0 0.60 0 0.60 1.52 
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1996 0 0.30 0 0.30 1.23 
1997 0 0.10 0 0.10 1.07 
1998 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
1999 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
2000 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
2001 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 
2002 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.00 


























In Graph 1, which accompanies Table 2, volatile phases in Supreme Court 
history—defined by rapid turnover among the Justices—appear as peaks.  Valleys 
represent relatively tranquil periods.  The use of an exponential vertical scale 
enhances the graph’s readability, albeit at the price of exaggerating the apparent 
magnitude of volatile periods.  Moreover, I freely admit what one of my expert 
mathematical advisors observed—that my resort to an exponential scale “has no 
mathematical justification in the context of modeling” this problem. 
The most volatile epoch in Supreme Court history (aside from George 
Washington’s initial round of appointments) occurred during the Taft 
administration.  President Taft, himself a future Chief Justice, managed to make 
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six appointments during his single term in the White House.  Five of those 
appointments, including that of Chief Justice Edward White, took place within the 
span of a year and a day, from January 3, 1910, to January 3, 1911. 
Taft’s own judicial career also marked an important milestone in Supreme 
Court history.  Within twenty months of appointing Taft as Chief Justice, 
President Harding added three Associate Justices to the membership of the Court.  
The first half of the Taft Court, therefore, experienced a relatively high degree of 
turnover among the Justices.  The later portions of the Taft Court coincided with 
the Judiciary Act of 1925,56 which replaced much of the mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with discretionary review by writs of certiorari.  
Robert Post’s study of the later Taft Court, as magisterial in its scope as it is 
empirically rigorous, demonstrates how the Judiciary Act transformed the Court 
from “primarily a tribunal of ultimate resort” and a “source of appellate review, 
whose chief function was correctly to discern and to protect the federal rights of 
litigants,” into a nationwide forum for the declaration of the law of the land.57 
The last half-century has witnessed, on the whole, some of the most stable 
judicial epochs in American history.  Graph 1 reports three distinct troughs since 
1950.  First, after a flurry of appointments by President Eisenhower, the Warren 
Court settled into a period when new Justices joined the Court with relative 
infrequency.  Second, soon after the appointments of Lewis Powell and William 
Rehnquist, the Burger Court stabilized until President Reagan promoted then-
Justice Rehnquist to the center seat.  Finally, Graph 1 confirms, in visually vivid 
form, what has been obvious to any astute observer of the Supreme Court: the 
Court’s stability since 1994 has been extraordinary by any measure.  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, Chief Justice Rehnquist has overseen the halving of the Supreme 
Court’s docket.58 
The New Deal era merits special mention.  The years from 1910 through 
1932 were ones of rapid judicial turnover.  Seventeen new Justices joined the 
Court in less than a quarter-century; by comparison, a mere eight Supreme Court 
appointments have taken place in the nearly identical time span since Ronald 
Reagan’s first inaugural.  At the time of the New Deal, judicial turnover was not 
 
 56. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.  See generally ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 107-14 (1965) (documenting Taft’s instrumental role in 
the passage of the Act). 
 57. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal 
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (2001); cf., e.g., 
L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R.R. Comm’n, 289 U.S. 287, 304 (1933) (“We have emphasized the 
distinctive function of the court.  We do not sit as a board of revision, but to enforce constitutional 
rights.”). 
 58. Compare Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 
(1987), with Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
403. 
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an altogether politically neutral phenomenon.  Of the seventeen appointments 
from 1910 through 1932, all but three came courtesy of Republican Presidents.  
The later portions of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration were also characterized 
by rapid turnover among the Justices.  The two decades of Democratic control of 
the White House after the 1932 election yielded nearly as many Supreme Court 
appointments as Presidents Taft, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover had made in the 
preceding generation.  Indeed, from Horace Lurton in 1910 to Potter Stewart in 
1958, the Supreme Court welcomed thirty-five new Justices in less than half a 
century.  It has taken forty-four years—roughly twice the length of the 1910-32 
span—for the next seventeen Justices to reach the Court. 
The longest gap between Justices during the twentieth century, however, at 
least before the post-Stephen Breyer drought, took place at the beginning of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency.  Whatever the duration of the Justices’ memory 
of new appointments, President Roosevelt surely chafed at what he must have 
perceived as a historical anomaly and a political indignity.  If nothing else, the 
sixty-five-month span between Justices Cardozo and Black helped inspire 
President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan. 
B. The Unavoidable Randomness of Justice 
A final series of statistical observations is in order.  Reorganizing the record 
of Supreme Court appointments by Term, as exhibited in Table 2, provides strong 
evidence that the arrival of new Justices is an essentially random phenomenon.  If 
Supreme Court membership were truly responsive to shifts in national politics, 
changes in Court personnel would track political cycles at the White House and 
on Capitol Hill.  At a minimum, each new presidential administration might bring 
with it a new infusion of judicial blood at the Supreme Court.  The federal 
judiciary’s guarantee of life tenure, however, gets in the way.  Alternatively, one 
might guess that the timing of Justices’ retirements might depend partly on the 
degree of doctrinal upheaval on the Court.  All other things being equal, a boring 
stretch might persuade an elderly Justice to favor retirement and leisure over 
continued service on the Court.  Ultimately, neither of these hypotheses has any 
merit.  A simple statistical test demonstrates that Supreme Court appointments are 
in fact both infrequent and random. 
I shall cast this statistical test in formal terms.  My null hypothesis (H0) is 
that the actual record of Supreme Court appointments fits a Poisson 
distribution.  As I will show imminently, a Poisson distribution describes 
events that may be characterized, in colloquial terms, as random and rare.  I 
shall test the null hypothesis against a pair of alternative hypotheses.  Let the 
first alternative hypothesis (H1) represent the political explanation of judicial 
turnover—that is, that Supreme Court appointments track changes in 
presidential administrations.  Let the second alternative hypothesis (H2) 
represent the legal explanation of judicial turnover—that is, that Supreme 
Court Justices retire when the job no longer poses sufficient doctrinal 
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challenges to outweigh the allure of leisure or alternate employment.  Unless 
statistical analysis of the data gives us reason to reject H0, the null hypothesis, 
we should prefer it over either of the alternative hypotheses, H1 or H2. 
The Poisson distribution describes the probability that a random event will 
occur in an interval, either temporal or spatial, where the probability of the event 
is small, but the number of trials is large enough so that the event actually 
occurs.59  Typically deployed to model such phenomena as radioactive decay, 
manufacturing defects, or even the number of goals scored in the National 
Hockey League,60 the Poisson distribution accurately models the expectation that 
a particular number of Justices (zero, one, two, or more) will be appointed during 
any Supreme Court Term.  More formally, the Poisson distribution represents the 
limiting form of the binomial distribution as the probability (p) of a success 
approaches 0 and the number of trials (N) approaches , while the mean (μ = Np) 
remains fixed.  The probability of observing exactly r successes in this model is 






where μ is the average number of Supreme Court appointments per Term.  
According to Tables 1 and 2, μ is 0.498 if we omit the six appointments made 
from October 1789 through September 1790.  Inserting this value for μ for the 
213 imputed Supreme Court Terms from 1790 through 2001 yields the following 
table: 
 
 59. See generally J. LEROY FOLKS, IDEAS OF STATISTICS 118-19 (1981) (deriving the Poisson 
formula from the binomial distribution formula); FREDERICK MOSTELLER ET AL., JOINT COMM. ON 
THE CURRICULUM IN STATISTICS & PROBABILITY OF THE AM. STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION & THE 
NAT’L COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF MATHEMATICS, STATISTICS BY EXAMPLE: FINDING MODELS 71-
73 (1973) (same).  For other descriptions of the Poisson function, see MORRIS H. DEGROOT, 
OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS 35 (1970); WILLIAM FELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION 156-57 (3d ed. 1968). 
 60. See Gary M. Mullet, Siméon Poisson and the National Hockey League, AM. STATISTICIAN, 
Feb. 1977, at 8 (demonstrating how the Poisson distribution describes the number of goals scored for 
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TABLE 3 
 
Poisson Distribution—Expected Supreme Court Appointments per Term 
 
 Appointments Probability Number of Terms 
 0 0.6080 129.49 
 1 0.3026 64.44 
 2 0.0753 16.04 
 3 0.0125 2.66 
 4 0.0016 0.33 
 5 0.0002 0.03 
 6 0.0000 0.00 
 7 0.0000 0.00 
 8 0.0000 0.00 
 9 0.0000 0.00 
 Total 1.0000  213.00 
 





Actual Distribution of Supreme Court Appointments per Term 
 
 Appointments Proportion Number of Terms 
 0 0.6150 131 
 1 0.2911 62 
 2 0.0798 17 
 3 0.0094 2 
 4 0.0047 1 
 5 0.0000 0 
 6 0.0000 0 
 7 0.0000 0 
 8 0.0000 0 
 9 0.0000 0 
 Total 1.0000 213 
 
This mathematical exercise reconfirms what one statistical analysis 
demonstrated in 1936,61 another confirmed in 1971,62 and yet another study 
 
 61. See W. Allen Wallis, The Poisson Distribution and the Supreme Court, 31 J. AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 376 (1936). 
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confirmed in 1982:63 the Poisson distribution describes turnover on the Supreme 
Court of the United States.  Notably, the standard deviation in the actual 
distribution of Supreme Court appointments per Term is 0.723.  The standard 
deviation of the Poisson distribution is the square root of the second moment of 
probability distribution (that is, the variance).  Quite happily, there is a simple 
way to express this daunting definition of the standard deviation in a Poisson 
distribution: it coincides with the square root of μ    .  If μ = 0.498, then 
σ = 0.705.  The equivalence of σ² with μ provides a “check on the conformity of 
[actual] observations to the Poisson distribution.”64 
That σ² = μ in a Poisson distribution also simplifies the computation for chi-
square between expected and observed frequencies.  The standard formula for Χ² 






where xi represents a distinct set of observations.  Substituting the values for σ² 
and μ in the standard Χ² equation provides a goodness-of-fit test of the actual 
record of Supreme Court appointments with the pattern of appointments expected 





where xi represents the number of actual Terms in which i Justices were appointed 
and Ei represents the number of Terms out of 213 for which the Poisson 
distribution predicts the appointment of i Justices. 
Applying the Χ² formula to the data reported in Tables 3 and 4 is a 
straightforward matter.  I have computed Χ² after compressing into a single bin 
(“3+”) all Terms in which three or more Supreme Court appointments took place.  
The resulting four-bin computation yields a Χ² of 0.1684, with two degrees of 
freedom.65  Inserting these values into the formula for the goodness-of-fit statistic 
derived from the cumulative distribution function, 1 - cdf(df,Χ²), reports a value 
 
 62. See Earl Callen & Henning Leidecker, Jr., A Mean Life on the Supreme Court, 57 A.B.A. J. 
1188 (1971). 
 63. See S. Sidney Ulmer, Supreme Court Appointments as a Poisson Distribution, 26 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 113 (1982). 
 64. Wallis, supra note 61, at 379. 
 65. According to the 1936 study that pioneered the application of the Poisson distribution to the 
record of Supreme Court appointments, “[t]wo degrees of freedom are lost from the maximum of 
four because (1) the mean and (2) the total frequency of the theoretical distribution are determined 
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of 0.919.  In ordinary language, this value means that a random distribution of 
appointments has more than a 90% chance of matching or exceeding the actual 
distribution’s divergence from the expected Poisson distribution. 
A four-bin computation, however, violates the statistician’s rule of thumb 
that an X2 calculation should be avoided if any Ei is less than 5.  The “3+” bin, 
which represents the sum of the fourth through tenth rows in Table 3, contains 
approximately 3 observations.  In more formal terms, E3+ ≈ 3 < 5.  
Compressing the “2” and “3+” bins into a single “2+” bin yields approximately 
19 observations and thereby overcomes the problem of small numbers.  The 
resulting three-bin computation generates a X2 of 0.1563.  Combining that X2 
value with one degree of freedom into the goodness-of-fit formula derived 
from the cumulative distribution function yields a P of 0.693.  Colloquially 
speaking, even the less precise three-bin test shows nearly a 70% chance that 
Supreme Court appointments do not follow some politically or legally 
mediated process, but rather occur randomly. 
With the benefit of all 213 years of Supreme Court history, my four-bin 
calculation fits the null hypothesis—H0 in this instance being conformity with the 
Poisson distribution—somewhat better than a five-bin calculation performed on 
1790-1980 data66 and a four-bin calculation performed on the basis of the Court’s 
record from 1837-1932.67  As the number of Terms increases, the Poisson 
distribution improves its ability to describe the pattern of Supreme Court 
appointments.  That the Court has varied in size from seven to ten Justices 
throughout its history is apparently “not a significant factor in the relationship.”68  
What is significant is that Supreme Court vacancies fit the random null hypothesis 
better than either the political or legal variant of my two alternative hypotheses. 
Finally, treating the arrival of new Supreme Court Justices as a phenomenon 
that conforms with the Poisson function enables us to compute the probability 
(“q”) that r Justices would be appointed within t Terms.  Because the arithmetic 
mean is a “sufficient” statistic for the Poisson distribution,69 and because 
probabilities scale over time in exact accordance with the Poisson distribution 
overall, a modest modification of the basic Poisson formula enables us to compute 
q for any r equal to or greater than 0:  
 
 66. See Ulmer, supra note 63, at 114.  Ulmer reported Χ² = 1.36 with three degrees of freedom, 
which yielded a P of .72. 
 67. See Wallis, supra note 61, at 379.  Wallis reported Χ² = 0.6771 with two degrees of 
freedom, which yielded a P of 0.713.  Callen and Leidecker’s 1971 study, which used 1837-1970 
data, performed no Χ² analysis, simply reporting instead that the expected Poisson distribution was 
“in remarkable agreement with historical fact.”  Callen & Leidecker, supra note 62, at 1190. 
 68. Ulmer, supra note 63, at 114. 
 69. See Wallis, supra note 61, at 379 n.4 (defining a sufficient statistic as one that “alone 
includes all of the information relevant to fitting the function which can be obtained from the 
observations”). 
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Using this formula enables us to compute the probability of specific appointment 
“events” relating to the Supreme Court during one or two presidential Terms.  
Mathematics can, thus, inform us of the historic likelihood of events such as 
President Carter’s Supreme Court shutout, the post-Breyer drought, and that Holy 
Grail of the judicially inclined President—appointing a Supreme Court majority 
during two Terms in the White House. 
Presidential shutouts involve the special case of r = 0.  This simplifies the 
Poisson formula considerably: if r = 0, the first factor in the numerator and the 
denominator both equal 1.  Therefore, the probability that no Justice will be 
appointed during a stretch of t Terms equals e-μt, and the probability that a single-
term President would appoint at least one Justice equals 1 - e-μt.  Retaining the 
assumption that μ = 0.498 tells us that the probability that a one-term President 
would appoint at least one Justice is 86.3%.  A study conducted in 1982, soon 
after the end of the Carter presidency, similarly calculated a 13% probability that 
a one-term President would suffer a Supreme Court shutout.70 
The probability of a Supreme Court drought as long as the one that has 
prevailed since Justice Breyer’s appointment equals the probability that a two-
term President would appoint no Justices.  Inserting 8 for t in our formula, e-μt, 
yields a probability of 1.9 percent. 
The third prospect is the one that requires the most complex—and, in real-
world terms, the least accurate—mathematical formula.  Presumably any number 
of appointments from five to nine would enable a President to appoint a majority 
of Justices.  The critical (and arguably unsound) assumption is that each of those 
appointments would replace an incumbent Justice whose own appointment would 
predate the tenure of the President in question.  As Franklin Roosevelt discovered, 
it is, indeed, possible for a President to burn a Supreme Court appointment 
replacing one of his or her earlier appointees.  His ninth appointment, Wiley 
Rutledge, replaced James Byrnes rather than Owen Roberts, a holdover from the 
Hoover administration who would eventually yield to Harold Hitz Burton.  
Nevertheless, a modest modification of the Poisson formula enables us to 
compute q for a series defined by r  5: 
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If t = 8, this formula reports a result of 0.367.  The relatively low probability that a 
single President can appoint a majority of the Justices has enhanced scholarly 
confidence in the Court’s institutional ability to survive even a motivated and 
popular President’s ambition of reshaping the Court in his or her own image.71  
Curiously enough, of the five Presidents after Washington who made at least five 
Supreme Court appointments—Jackson (five), Lincoln (five), Taft (six), Franklin 
Roosevelt (nine), and Eisenhower (five)—only Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight 
Eisenhower served two full terms or more. 
IV.  FINDING DOCTRINAL INNOVATION WITHIN THE FOSSIL RECORD 
A. Academic Instinct and Citation Science 
All that remains is a jurisprudential assessment of this historical evidence.  
Entire academic careers can be and have been devoted to close examination of 
one period or another of Supreme Court history, but I shall content myself here 
with the crudest of preliminary assessments.  If Professor Merrill’s hypothesis is 
correct, then the following stable judicial epochs should be associated with bold 
doctrinal innovation, produced by a single dominant coalition of Justices: 
 
· The late Marshall Court, 1812-35 (except perhaps 1826); 
· The Taney Court in the decade and a half before the Civil War; 
· The Fuller Court, especially as it matured; 
· The Warren Court after 1958; 
· The Burger Court after 1973; and 
· The “second” Rehnquist Court, from 1994 to the present. 
 
At least at first blush, all of these periods have some plausible claim to 
heightened doctrinal creativity.  The mystery and majesty of Marbury v. 
Madison72 aside, Chief Justice Marshall delivered his most enduring opinions 
after the 1812 arrival of fellow nationalist Joseph Story: McCulloch v. 
Maryland,73 Cohens v. Virginia,74 Gibbons v. Ogden,75 and Johnson v. 
McIntosh,76 among others. 
 
 71. See Michael Comiskey, Can a President Pack—or Draft—the Supreme Court?  FDR and 
the Court in the Great Depression and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043, 1057 & n.92 (1994); 
Michael Comiskey, The Real and Imagined Consequences of Senatorial Consent to Silent Supreme 
Court Nominees, 11 J.L. & POL. 41, 58 & n.88 (1995). 
 72. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 73. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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The legacies of Chief Justices Taney and Fuller will forever be associated 
with the singularly regrettable constitutional frolic and detour of each Court: Dred 
Scott v. Sandford77 and Lochner v. New York.78  The Warren Court, of course, 
was legendary for its doctrinal ingenuity and its willingness to “cast overboard 
numerous settled decisions, and indeed even whole areas of law, with an 
unceremonious ‘heave-ho.’”79  The Warren Court overruled forty-five decisions, 
including thirty-three from 1963 through 1969, thereby increasing by more than a 
third what had been the Court’s record to date of eighty-eight overrulings.80  For 
its part, “[t]he Burger Court, far from reversing or otherwise undoing its 
predecessor Warren Court, was marked by a generally surprising penchant for 
judicial activism, even in such unexpected areas as civil rights and civil 
liberties.”81  The very existence of a “second” Rehnquist Court, of course, is the 
premise of Professor Merrill’s Childress Lecture. 
By the same token, however, we should expect to find more flexible 
coalition-building and less doctrinal innovation during periods of greater turnover 
among Supreme Court Justices.  Almost by definition, the accession of a new 
Chief Justice represents this sort of disturbance.  During the twentieth century, 
two series of rapid appointments stand out above all others: President Taft’s 
infusion of six Justices from January 1910 through March 1912 and the 
appointment of nine Justices during President Franklin Roosevelt’s second and 
third terms.  A third episode warrants honorable mention: President Harding 
managed to appoint four Justices, including former President Taft as Chief 
Justice, before death truncated his administration. 
The presence of the New Deal Court, especially after 1937, in the category of 
highly volatile periods in Supreme Court history deals a serious blow to Professor 
Merrill’s hypothesis.  The Supreme Court during the late New Deal was able to 
combine serious doctrinal consensus with radical rearrangement of precedent.  
The primary difference between that Court and today’s Court is political, not 
methodological.  But unlike the second Rehnquist Court, the Court during the 
transition from Charles Evans Hughes to Harlan Fiske Stone was extraordinarily 
active in shedding old Justices and acquiring new ones.  If anything, the Hughes 
Court had been very stable in the years; Hugo Black’s arrival in 1937 triggered a 
judicial revolution—in personnel and in doctrine—not thitherto seen in American 
history.  In the crucial span of Terms from 1938 through 1940, Table 2’s “chaos” 
index registered an eye-popping sequence: 2.70, 2.30, and 5.30.  This tumult 
 
 75. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 76. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 77. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 78. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 79. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 109 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 80. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 486 (2000). 
 81. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 349 (3d ed. 1992). 
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coincided with cases such as West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,82 United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.,83 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,84 United States 
v. Darby,85 and Wickard v. Filburn.86  These were hardly diffident decisions.  
Indeed, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,87 decided during the 1937 Term, was 
perhaps the most celebrated overruling at that point in Supreme Court history.  
The chaos index remained at or above 2.00 until the 1943 Term.  These numbers 
have never been matched throughout William Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice.  
Something gave rise to the constitutional creativity of the New Deal Court, but 
stability in personnel evidently played no role. 
What I have provided so far, however, indulges in the very sort of 
“ideational” critique that Professor Merrill has shunned.  As expiation for that 
lapse, I shall apply three more or less empirical measures of doctrinal foment.  
First, I shall glance quickly at an empirically derived list of the Court’s most 
influential decisions (as determined by the number of citations per case by the 
Supreme Court itself and by the federal courts of appeals).  If Professor Merrill’s 
hypothesis is correct, these decisions should accumulate during periods of relative 
stability in the Court’s membership.  Second, I shall conduct my own crude count 
of citations of decisions from individual Supreme Court Terms.  Again, higher 
counts should correlate to more tranquil periods of the Court’s history.  Finally, a 
simple survey of overrulings by the Court over time helps to confirm whether 
periods of doctrinal upheaval correspond with periods of low turnover. 
One last methodological note is in order.  Two of the measures I will use are 
based on citation frequency, which is admittedly “at best a crude and rough proxy 
for measuring influence.”88  Citation studies, often deployed to determine 
scholarly impact,89 run riot as measures of judicial influence90 (or its absence).91  
 
 82. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 83. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 84. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 85. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 86. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 87. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)). 
 88. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A 
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998). 
 89. See, e.g., Jonathan Cole & Stephen Cole, Measuring the Quality of Sociological Research: 
Problems in the Use of the Science Citation Index, 6 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 23 (1971); Fred R. Shapiro, 
The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985). 
 90. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990); 
John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 
1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An 
Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960 and 1970, 
50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). 
 91. See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 460 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 481 (1983). 
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The primary reason for their allure turns out to be their biggest shortcoming: 
scholars count citations to their own work and to judicial decisions because they 
represent one of the most easily acquired pools of empirical data.92  Other 
limitations on this mode of analysis will become evident as we apply it. 
B. Most Influential Decisions 
The abundance of citation studies measuring judicial reputations obscures an 
embarrassing shortcoming in the literature: “relatively little empirical work is 
available on the reputation of [individual] case[s].”93  Fortunately, one leading 
survey of judicial influence has bridged this gap.  In his study of differences in 
influence among the Justices, Montgomery Kosma derived a list of the twenty-
five most influential decisions in Supreme Court history.94  I list these decisions 




The 25 Most Influential Decisions in Supreme Court History 
(as reported in Montgomery Kosma’s 1998 survey) 
 
1. McCulloch v. Maryland95 (February Term 1819) 
2. Gibbons v. Ogden96 (February 1824) 
3. Boyd v. United States97 (October 1885) 
4. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee98 (February 1816) 
5. Osborn v. President of the Bank of the United States99 (February 1824) 
6. Missouri v. Illinois100 (October 1905) 
7. Cooley v. Board of Wardens101 (December 1851) 
8. Brown v. Maryland102 (January 1827) 
9. Yick Wo v. Hopkins103 (October 1885) 
 
 92. See Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical 
Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, at 1, 2, at 
http://www.bepress.com/ils. 
 93. Michael E. Solimine, The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson: An Empirical Note, 56 ALB. L. 
REV. 773, 775 (1993) (assessing the impact of Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963)). 
 94. See Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 333, 359 (1998). 
 95. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 96. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 97. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 98. 14 (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 99. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 100. 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
 101. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
 102. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). 
 103. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] JUDICIAL EPOCHS IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 709 
10. Ex parte Young104 (October 1908) 
11. The Minnesota Rate Cases105 (October 1912) 
12. Pennoyer v. Neff106 (October 1877) 
13. Weeks v. United States107 (October 1913) 
14. Marbury v. Madison108 (February 1803) 
15. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States109 (October 1910) 
16. Union Refrigeration Transit Co. v. Kentucky110 (October 1905) 
17. The Slaughter-House Cases111 (December 1872) 
18. Cohens v. Virginia112 (February 1821) 
19. Mugler v. Kansas113 (October 1887) 
20. Swift & Co. v. United States114 (October 1904) 
21. Fletcher v. Peck115 (February 1810) 
22. Cantwell v. Connecticut116 (October 1939) 
23. The Second Employers’ Liability Cases117 (October 1911) 
24. Carroll v. United States (October 1924)118 
25. Paul v. Virginia (December 1868)119 
 
The most striking characteristic of these twenty-five cases is their vintage.  
Exactly one case among these twenty-five (Cantwell) postdates the New Deal 
revolution in constitutional thought, and it involves First Amendment questions 
one step removed from the issues of congressional power and judicial review 
most often associated with the Hughes and Stone Courts.  This quirk arises, I 
suspect, from Kosma’s heroic efforts to overcome the tendency of judicial 
precedent to decline in value over time.  Citation rates decay over time; judicial 
decisions have, as it were, relatively short half-lives.120  Kosma developed not one 
but two techniques for offsetting temporal distortions of efforts to gauge the 
 
 104. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 105. 230 U.S. 352 (1913). 
 106. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 107. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 108. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 109. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 110. 199 U.S. 194 (1905). 
 111. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 112. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 113. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 114. 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
 115. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 116. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 117. 223 U.S. 1 (1912). 
 118. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 119. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). 
 120. See Landes & Posner, supra note 90; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Citations, 
Age, Fame, and the Web, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (2000). 
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influence of different cases and Justices.  In addition to a “citation price index” to 
counteract inflation in the number of opinions (especially at the circuit court 
level) and in the number of citations per opinions,121 Kosma also discounted 
precedent to reflect the “time value of an opinion.”122  The latter adjustment 
yielded a discount rate of 6.5%,123 while the former had the effect, for instance, of 
treating “a 1900 opinion that has been cited 10 times” as the equivalent of “a 1960 
opinion that has been cited 18 times.”124 
In Kosma’s defense, his reliance on judicial citations to the exclusion of 
citations in the secondary legal literature provides a critical counterweight to 
whatever academic bias I might bring to the table.  “Ideational” critiques by law 
professors often bear little resemblance to the legal issues that concern courts the 
most.125  One example drawn from Justice Rufus Peckham’s œuvre juridique 
illustrates the point.  Lochner v. New York,126 “a favorite of law professors” (if 
only as a stalking horse), turns out to be less influential than Ex parte Young by a 
factor of three.127  Evidently many law professors forget that law, until further 
notice, remains “what the courts . . . do in fact, and nothing more pretentious.”128  
Mindful of that trap, I endorse Kosma’s exclusive reliance on judicial citations. 
Quibbles over Kosma’s methodology, therefore, are just that.  Comparisons 
within his list of the twenty-five most influential decisions prove quite 
illuminating.  Rearranging the decisions on his list in chronological order enables 
us to see whether a disproportionate number of those decisions arose during 
volatile or tranquil periods of Supreme Court membership: 
 
 121. Kosma, supra note 94, at 341-47. 
 122. Id. at 347.  For more elaborate discussions of the difference between inflation and discount 
rates, see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jim Chen, The Price of 
Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
(forthcoming July 2003). 
 123. Kosma, supra note 94, at 348. 
 124. Id. at 347. 
 125. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 42 (1992) (“The growing disjunction between legal 
education and legal practice is most salient with respect to scholarship. There has been a clear 
decline in the volume of ‘practical’ scholarship . . . .”); Ellen A. Peters, Reality and the Language of 
the Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1193, 1193 (1981) (lamenting the “increasing divergence between the 
theoretical interests of the aspiring academic lawyer and the pragmatic interests of the successful 
practitioner”).  See generally Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do 
Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871 
(1996). 
 126. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 127. Kosma, supra note 94, at 354 n.43. 
 128. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897), 
reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 994 (1997). 
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TABLE 6 
 
Incidence of “Influential” Decisions During Different Courts 
and in Individual Terms 
 
Marshall Court (9): 1801, 1810, 1812, 1816, 1819, 1821, 1824 (twice), and 
 1827 Terms. 
Taney (1): 1851. 
Chase (2): 1868 and 1872. 
Waite (4): 1877, 1885 (twice), 1887. 
Fuller (4): 1904 (twice), 1905, 1908. 
White (4): 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913. 
Taft (1): 1924. 
Hughes (1): 1939. 
 
Perhaps half of these decisions stem from two of the calmer periods in 
Supreme Court membership: the seven Marshall Court decisions from the 1812 
through the 1824 Terms, plus the four decisions from the last half-decade of 
Melville Fuller’s tenure as Chief Justice.  On the other hand, the four decisions 
from the opening years of the White Court and the lone decision from the New 
Deal era (Cantwell) coincided with some of the most dramatic episodes of 
turnover among the Justices. 
Admittedly, a list of greatest judicial hits derived from citation counts is liable 
to undercount “category-killer” precedents whose overwhelming effectiveness 
actually suppresses the number of subsequent citations.129  Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,130 for instance, controls the choice of law in every case arising under 
the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction and in every claim those courts address 
through their supplemental jurisdiction.  Yet it fails to make the top twenty-five in 
Kosma’s study, although it does join other blockbusters such as Munn v. 
Illinois,131 Ex parte Virginia,132 Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus and Mary,133 Powell v. Alabama,134 Brown v. Board of Education,135 and 
NAACP v. Alabama,136 in a cluster of cases whose influence falls just shy of the 
top twenty-five.137  Adding these cases relieves the problem of small sample size 
 
 129. Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 88, at 274. 
 130. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)). 
 131. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
 132. 100 U.S. 339 (1880). 
 133. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 134. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 135. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 136. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 137. Kosma, supra note 94, at 357-58 (including these cases in a list of the most influential 
opinions of each Supreme Court Justice). 
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somewhat, but adds no greater clarity to our analysis.  Of these additional cases, 
only three (Munn, Ex parte Virginia, and perhaps Powell) can be fairly described 
as the product of the Court during tranquil times.  Erie and Brown came on the 
heels of politically significant changes in the Court’s personnel. 
The simplest test of correspondence between doctrinal foment and stability in 
Supreme Court personnel, therefore, fails to deliver conclusive answers.  
Consequently, I turn to a tool that ignores individual decisions altogether: overall 
citation counts. 
C. Overall Citation Counts 
1. The overall ALLFEDS measure 
The simple expedient of counting citations, used often to measure judicial 
reputations and less frequently to measure the impact of individual cases, can 
reflect the influence of an entire Supreme Court Term.  Citations to decisions 
from a particular Term may reflect that Term’s impact on the federal judiciary.  In 
compiling citation counts per Term, I performed the simplest of searches in 
Westlaw’s ALLFEDS database, which collects decisions since 1945 rendered by 
the Supreme Court, the federal courts of appeals, the federal district courts, and an 
assortment of other federal courts.  All searches took place on August 6, 2002, 
and, therefore, reflect the state of Westlaw’s database as of that date.  Westlaw’s 
timely updating of this database poses a small methological problem for 
duplication of my technique, but also supplies the cure.  To exclude decisions 
added after my visit to Westlaw, add the phrase «ad(<8/7/2002) &» at the 
beginning of any of my searches.138 
I collected citations in four steps.  First, I designed a basic search to retrieve 
citations to specific volumes of United States Reports: 
 
“[volume] U.S.” % “cert. denied, [volume] U.S.” 
 
where [volume] represents the appropriate volume of United States Reports. 
Second, I modified the basic search for citations to the earliest Supreme Court 
decisions.  Citations to those decisions have used the name of the Reporter of 
Decisions in addition to—or sometimes in the place of—the United States 
Reports citation.  Marbury v. Madison, for example, has been cited variously as 5 
 
 138. Some, but not all, decisions are posted to Westlaw on the date they are released.  The 
added-date restriction (AD) searches documents based on the date the document was added to 
Westlaw.  This will provide consistency with my results.  Thus, a decision dated August 1 that 
was added to Westlaw on August 15 would not appear in the added-date restricted search, 
matching the results received on August 8.  The more familiar date restriction (DA) selects cases 
based on the date of the decision—not the date they were added to Westlaw databases.  
Consequently, this restriction cannot guarantee the same results I obtained. 
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U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) or as 1 Cranch 137 (1803), but almost never simply as 
5 U.S. 137 (1803).  To account for this citation practice, I substituted the 
following search for volumes 1 through 90 of United States Reports: 
 
“[volume] [Reporter]” % “cert. denied, [volume] [Reporter]” 
 
where [Reporter] represents the name or abbreviation by which one of these older 
volumes of United States Reports is typically cited. 
Avoidance of citations such as “5 U.S.” also avoids a significant source of 
false positives.  Because spacing after periods is irregular on Westlaw, the 
database sometimes reports citations to the United States Code as citations to the 
corresponding volume of United States Reports.  Thus, a search for “5 U.S.,” 
though intended to retrieve citations to Marbury, yields many citations to the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
Third, I made an extremely small and discrete adjustment for one case cited 
almost exclusively by the Supreme Court and almost exclusively for the 
proposition that the syllabus prepared by the Court’s Reporter of Decisions does 
not constitute part of the opinion of the Court.139  I refer, of course, to United 
States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,140 which was reported in volume 200 of 
United States Reports.  To compound the misery, the Supreme Court has been 
inconsistent in citing its favorite case.  Of late, the Court has cited the case by its 
full name,141 but as recently as 1996 it has called this case United States v. Detroit 
Lumber Co.142  However it is cited, Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. comprises 
nearly seven-eighths of all references in ALLFEDS to volume 200 of United 
States Reports.143  The unadjusted number of hits for volume 200 exceeded the 
number of hits for volume 199 by a factor of eight and the number of hits for 201 
by a factor of four.144  I, therefore, eliminated references to Detroit Timber & 
Lumber Co. from my volume 200 data by performing the following search: 
 
“200 U.S.” % “cert. denied, 200 U.S.” % (Detroit +1 Timber Lumber) 
 
 
 139. See generally Gil Grantmore, The Headnote, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 157 (2002). 
 140. 200 U.S. 321 (1906). 
 141. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 32 (2000). 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 839 (1996).  The disparity 
apparently arose from an inadvertent omission of the words “Timber &” from the citation in May 
1979.  See Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 
JURIMETRICS J. 291, 302 (1999); Grantmore, supra note 139, at 158 n.5 (observing in addition that 
the mistake has been corrected). 
 143. To be precise, it accounted for all but 520 hits out of 4255 hits registered by an ALLFEDS 
search on Aug. 6, 2002, for «“200 U.S.” % “cert. denied, 200 U.S.”». 
 144. Again to be precise, the unadjusted basic search yielded 4255 hits for “200 U.S.,” but only 
552 for “199 U.S.” and 998 for “201 U.S.” 
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Finally, I converted citations to individual volumes of United States Reports 
into citations to corresponding Supreme Court Terms.  I relied on a table 
compiled by Donald J. Kochan, which links volumes of United States Reports to 
the Term in which the Supreme Court decided the cases reported in those 
pages.145  For example, volumes 434 through 438 contain the decisions rendered 
by the Court during October Term 1977.  I therefore combined all citations to 
those volumes into a single figure for the 1977 Term.  Not all volumes of United 
States Reports, however, correspond so neatly to a Term beginning in October.  In 
1873, the Court adopted its modern convention of beginning its Term in October.  
For Terms before 1873, I defined the relevant annual unit as any Term beginning 
in any month that year.  Since 1873, however, the Supreme Court’s calendar has 
adopted a October-to-September rhythm.  For those years, therefore, I have 
assigned occasional summer Terms to the regular Term that began the preceding 
October.  For instance, I have treated August Term 1958 as an extension of 
October Term 1957 rather than a prologue to October Term 1958. 
Special problems arise from the Supreme Court’s occasional practice of using 
a single volume of United States Reports to publish decisions from the end of one 
Term and decisions from the beginning of the next.  For instance, pages 1 through 
202 of volume 326 report decisions from the end of October Term 1944, while 
pages 203 through 678 report decisions from the beginning of the 1945 Term.  
Achieving convenience at some cost in accuracy, I assigned citation counts for all 
such volumes according to number of pages used to report each Term’s decisions.  
Thus, I credited just under 30% (202 divided by 678) of citations to volume 326 
to the 1944 Term and credited the balance to the 1945 Term. 
These results require so much horizontal space that I divided them into two 
tables.  Graphs 2 and 3, in combination, report ALLFEDS citations by Supreme 
Court Term from August Term 1791 through the present.  Graph 2 covers all 
Terms through October Term 1924; Graph 3 covers all Terms since.  I chose the 
Judiciary Act of 1925 as my dividing point. 
 
 145. Donald J. Kochan, Pages Per Term in the United States Reports and Converting Supreme 
Court Citations to Term Announced: A Statistical Research Tool, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1091, 1098-1110. 
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GRAPH 2 
 
Citations by Supreme Court Term, August Term 1791 






















Citations by Supreme Court Term, October Term 1925 
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These graphs display two obvious shortcomings of the data.  First, the sheer 
number of citations to each Term increases over time.  This sort of “inflation” 
results partly from the fact that legal precedent has a half-life.  It also reflects the 
recent growth in the number of decisions in the federal courts at large (except the 
Supreme Court).  “Citation creep,” or the tendency of federal judges and their law 
clerks to cite an ever greater number of sources in each opinion, accounts for the 
rest of the growth.  Over time these phenomena, acting in concert, have a very 
dramatic effect.  The number of citations to cases decided during the 1985 Term, 
by far the largest in my survey, exceeds the highest numbers for Terms from the 
early nineteenth century by two orders of magnitude. 
A second flaw in the data can be detected toward the end of Graph 3.  More 
recent decisions simply have not had an equivalent opportunity to register 
citations; much of their “citation flow” lies in the future.  This suppression of hits 
is especially visible for the entire Rehnquist Court.  As of this writing, courts have 
almost never cited volumes 534 through 536 of United States Reports, which will 
eventually cover the 2001 Term.  Searching for citations to the corresponding 
volume of the speedier Supreme Court Reporter (“122 S. Ct.”) would ameliorate, 
but not cure, the problem.  In all likelihood, therefore, Graph 3 provides no useful 
information on the Rehnquist Court (which, alas, is the occasion for this Childress 
Lecture and these responses to it). 
Although Graphs 2 and 3 supply no reliable information on a global basis—
that is, across all two centuries plus of Supreme Court history—they do provide 
interesting glimpses at doctrinal impact on a local, temporally bounded basis.  In 
light of the citation count’s steady tendency to climb over time, sustained dips in 
citation counts are especially noteworthy.  So are pronounced increases.  Reduced 
citation counts suggest periods of doctrinal stasis or even failure, whereas 
heightened counts suggest the opposite.  Methodologically speaking, the search 
for doctrinal shifts should begin with a search for local minima and maxima in 
these graphs. 
A casual glance at Graph 2 suggests that the following periods in early 
Supreme Court history were unusually quiet in doctrinal terms: 
 
· 1806 through 1818; 
· 1825 through 1843; 
· 1851 through 1865.  The next five Terms suggested a doctrinal revival 
that did not resume in earnest until 1877; 
· 1895 through 1907, with an argument that this trough continued until 
1910; and 
· 1912 or 1913 through 1921. 
 
Recall that Professor Merrill’s hypothesis would suggest that the three 
likeliest periods of doctrinal volatility before 1925 would have occurred from 
1812 through 1835 (the late Marshall Court), the final years of the Taney Court 
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(from 1846 or 1847 until President Lincoln’s first inaugural), and the Fuller Court 
after 1898.  If anything, these periods actually correspond with pronounced 
troughs in the record of subsequent citations.  In other words, during the first 
thirteen decades of Supreme Court history, overall citation counts affirmatively 
contradict Professor Merrill’s hypothesis. 
The pronounced increase of citations to decisions from the 1925 Term to the 
1985 Term makes Graph 3 more difficult to interpret, but several local maxima 












The total number of hits for 1985, which exceeded 140,000, is the largest number 
in my survey.  By contrast, 1935, 1953, and 1979 mark noteworthy minima in the 
post-1925 record. 
There is a striking correlation between peaks in Graph 3 and peaks in Graph 
1, which reports appointment activity on the Court.  To make the connection clear 
in narrative if not mathematically precise terms, I shall repeat Graph 3’s peak 
Terms with the Justice or Justices appointed in those Terms or in the immediately 
preceding Terms: 
 
· 1937: Black, Reed 
· 1940: Stone, Byrnes, Jackson; Murphy (1939) 
· 1945: Burton 
· 1957: Brennan (1956), Whittaker (1956) 
· 1962: Goldberg; White (1961) 
· 1971: Powell, Rehnquist 
· 1973: none 
· 1975: Stevens 
· 1985: none 
 
Several of those names—especially Black, Brennan, Goldberg, Powell, and 
Rehnquist—correspond to the most politically significant Supreme Court 
appointments of the twentieth century, at least among Associate Justices.  The 
exceptional Term in this sequence is 1985.  A trilogy of cases that Term—
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,146 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,147 and Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.148—simply happened to 
prescribe the resolution of summary judgment motions, perhaps the most 
significant development in the law of federal civil procedure since the adoption of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937.  October Term 1985, on the other 
hand, was the last Term over which Warren Burger presided as Chief Justice.  
The stunning fecundity of its civil procedure decisions may be credited to the 
exceptionally stable final years of the Burger regime. 
The low-tide Terms in Graph 3 provide a vivid contrast.  The 1935 and 1979 
Terms all marked periods of low turnover on the Court.  As of October 1935, the 
Court had remained stable since Justice Cardozo’s appointment in March 1932.  
The 1979 Term occurred in the midst of the quiet stretch from 1975 through 1981 
that eliminated President Carter’s opportunity to make a Supreme Court 
appointment.  The 1953 Term, of course, is an aberration in that Chief Justice 
Warren arrived in time to preside over the Court that October.  Then again, any 
Term in which the Court handed down Brown v. Board of Education149 cannot be 
considered a period of doctrinal stagnation, no matter what the citation data 
report. 
Suffice it to say that the raw citation data, far from validating Professor 
Merrill’s hypothesis, comes close to squarely contradicting the notion that the 
dynamics of repeat games among known players might encourage the Justices to 
take bolder doctrinal steps.  If anything, the record of citations suggest that rapid 
turnover, rather than stability in personnel, is the real catalyst of doctrinal 
innovation. 
2. A modified, time-delimited measure 
Out of concern that the negative implications of Graphs 2 and 3 might have 
resulted from my reliance on the entire ALLFEDS database, I decided to repeat 
my search for citations by Supreme Court Term with a much more temporally 
circumscribed base of cases.  Using the same techniques to harvest citations, I 
searched a four-year sample: cases in ALLFEDS decided from January 1, 1996 
through December 31, 1999.  Because citations to cases decided before 1900 were 
so few, I omitted those Terms.  I used the following Westlaw search: 
 




 146. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 147. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 148. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 149. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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where [volume] represents the relevant volume of United States Reports.  Again, I 
made an adjustment to exclude the Supreme Court’s ritual recitation of Detroit 
Timber & Lumber Co.  Graphs 4 and 5 report my results, respectively, for Terms 




Citations by Supreme Court Term, October Term 1900 through October 
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GRAPH 5 
 
Citations by Supreme Court Term, October Term 1950 through October Term 





















The peaks and valleys in Graphs 4 and 5 correspond almost exactly with 
those of Graph 3.  Peaks occur in the 1933, 1937, 1940, 1945, 1957, 1962, 1967, 
1973, 1975, and 1985 Terms.  With two exceptions, those years correspond 
almost exactly with the peaks reported in Graph 3.  As for 1933 and 1967, adding 
the Terms associated with the arrival of Justices Benjamin Cardozo and Thurgood 
Marshall strengthens the suggestion that new blood fosters rather than suppresses 
the judicial appetite for doctrinal innovation.  Graph 3’s 1935 trough is replaced 
in Graph 4 by a 1943 trough, while the 1979 dip, though extant, seems less 
significant than the decline experienced for cases from the 1974 Term.  October 
Term 1955, however, remains a singularly impressive local minimum in Graph 4. 
Though far from conclusive, Graph 5 also suggests that the Rehnquist Court 
is not moving, on the whole, from failed doctrine to a bolder set of decisions as it 
settles into a stable set of Justices.  If we exclude cases from 1996 onward, which 
are coextensive with or postdate my 1996-1999 study period, each Term during 
the entire Rehnquist Court has yielded roughly a third of the citations realized by 
the phenomenal 1985 Term. 
Neither of my citation counts provides meaningful support for Merrill’s 
Meteor.  If anything, they contradict Professor Merrill’s point.  I now move to a 
final measure of doctrinal activity: overrulings. 
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D. Overrulings 
One of the simplest measures of doctrinal activity is to count the number of 
decisions per Term that overrule previous decisions of the Supreme Court.  
Willful departures from stare decisis drive what Justice William O. Douglas 
called “constitutional flux.”150  Although this measure is warped over time in that 
the early Court had far fewer decisions it could overrule,151 counting overrulings 
should enable us to make meaningful comparisons between the Rehnquist Court 
and its twentieth-century predecessors.  Moreover, unlike citation counts, which 
favor the lower federal courts by virtue of the sheer weight of Federal Reporter 
and Federal Supplement, a measure based on the overruling of Supreme Court 
decisions enables us to focus exclusively on the high court.  The Supreme Court, 
after all, retains “the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”152 
The sine qua non of this measure is a reliable count of Supreme Court 
decisions that overrule prior decisions.  Fortunately, in compliance with its 
congressional mandate to provide a decennial annotation of the Constitution and 
to update that annotation on a biennial basis,153 the Congressional Research 
Service has provided a list of 219 such decisions.154  The CRS tabulation is 
comprehensive as of the end of October Term 1999.  I have added another four 
decisions through the end of the 2001 Term, based on my own count of cases in 
which the Court has explicitly overruled precedent.155  I omitted two cases in 
 
 150. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736-37 (1949); cf. Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 388 (1981) (describing the “general 
decay of stare decisis” as “the manifestation in legal thought of the marked, accelerating, and 
apparently irreversible decline in the belief of permanent ordering”).  But see Carolyn D. Richmond, 
Note, The Rehnquist Court: What Is in Store for Constitutional Law Precedent?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 511, 512 (1994) (arguing that “stare decisis may no longer be relied upon as a consistent 
indicator of the direction of constitutional law jurisprudence in the Supreme Court”). 
 151. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and 
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 78 (1991) (“It is practically impossible for the Court to decide 
any constitutional issue without first trying to determine the scope of prior decisions.”); Thomas R. 
Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 647, 649 (1999) (“Whereas the Court in Chief Justice Marshall’s day consistently 
wrote on a clean slate . . . , today’s Court routinely is faced with the task of reconciling or 
distinguishing prior decisions.”). 
 152. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 180 (1990) (plurality opinion); accord  State Oil Co. 
v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“it is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its 
precedents”). 
 153. See 2 U.S.C. § 168 (2000). 
 154. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 2245-56 (Johnny H. Killian 
& George A. Costello eds., 1996); id. at 171 (Supp. 2000) (Johnny H. Killian, George A. Costello & 
Kenneth R. Thomas eds.). 
 155. During October Term 2000, the Court decided one case that resulted in the overruling of at 
least one previous decision.  See United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001) (overruling Evans 
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which the opinion of the Court has left unrebutted a dissenter’s allegation that the 
majority opinion has effectively overruled precedent.156  I also omitted two other 
cases in which such an allegation was lodged, but was denied by a majority of the 
Justices.157 






















v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920)).  During the 2001 Term, the Court rendered three decisions of this 
nature.  See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002) (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 
639 (1990)); United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002) (overruling Ex parte Bain, 121 
U.S. 1 (1887)); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 623 (2002) 
(overruling Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945)). 
 156. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289 (2000) (1999 Term) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(accusing the majority of effectively overruling Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988)); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 371 (2000) 
(1999 Term ) (Souter, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of effectively overruling Pleasant Grove 
v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987)). 
 157. Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 n.13 (2000) (1999 Term) (declining 
to cast doubt on McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)), with id. at 533 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority effectively overruled McMillan), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 
U.S. 678, 694 (2001) (2000 Term) (declining to cast doubt on Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)), with id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
effectively overruled Mezei). 
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 158. There was, rather notoriously, no 1802 Term.  See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 
(1803); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 5; 
James M. O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 239 (1992). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 












































SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 












































SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 












































SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 



































Graph 6 reports the same information in five-year rolling averages, which I 
computed as much for their ameliorative impact on the information’s visual 
presentation as for an approximation of each overruling decision’s ongoing 
impact on decisional dynamics within the Court: 
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GRAPH 6 
 






















The 223 overrulings in Supreme Court history are far from evenly distributed.  
Over the course of 212 Terms, a Poisson distribution would predict seventy-five 
Terms in which the Supreme Court overrules no cases and seventy-eight in which 
the Court delivers a single opinion overruling precedent.  The actual numbers are 
116 and 42, respectively.  The Poisson distribution would predict a total of 
nineteen Terms in which the Court hands down three or more overrulings.  The 
actual record reveals thirty-four such Terms, including one in which the Court 
delivered seven overrulings and another in which the Court produced eight.  In 
other words, Justices die in more or less random fashion, but legal precedents do 
not.  Doctrinal change in law does not follow a linear path.  Like its biological 
analogue,159 legal evolution occurs in violent spurts punctuated by long periods of 
relative inactivity.160  As Gil Grantmore so eloquently writes: 
 
 159. Cf. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL 
HISTORY 179-85 (1980) (describing “the episodic nature of evolutionary change” as exhibiting a sort 
of “punctuated equilibrium”). 
 160. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001).  For the somewhat contrary 
argument that institutional rivalry keeps the law from reaching ideological extremes, see William N. 
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Chrysanthemums die 
in winter—but precedents, 
near the end of June.161 
 
The very fact that overrulings are not random strengthens their validity as a 
measure of the impact of other phenomena, such as turnover among the Justices, 
on Supreme Court behavior.  Indeed, the interplay between the frequency of 
Supreme Court appointments (a phenomenon whose essential randomness is 
demonstrated by its adherence to the Poisson function) and overrulings (which are 
perhaps the most visible manifestation of the attitudinal model of Supreme Court 
behavior) has a close parallel in evolutionary biology.  That field’s growing 
appreciation of “extinction through bad luck” as a crucial “element [of] the 
evolutionary process” adds a key analytical tool beyond Darwinian natural 
selection.162 
Supreme Court analysts can learn from baseball as well as biology.  In 
evaluating the record of overrulings in Supreme Court history, we would do well 
to borrow a technique from sabermetrics.163  Like baseball statistics, overrulings 
 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994). 
 161. Gil Grantmore, Constitutional Law Haiku, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 481, 481 (2001). 
 162. DAVID M. RAUP, EXTINCTION: BAD GENES OR BAD LUCK? 192 (1991). 
 163. Sabermetrics is “[t]he search for objective knowledge about baseball.”  BILL JAMES, THE 
BILL JAMES BASEBALL ABSTRACT 1987, at 297 (1987).  The word sabermetrics is derived from the 
acronym of the Society for American Baseball Research (SABR).  See http://www.sabr.org (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2003).  For those who have noticed the baseball leitmotif in this Article but cannot 
quite understand its spiritual significance, I offer the following apology: 
[B]aseball . . . brings together on one bright pastoral greensward those twin nineteenth-
century American deliriums: industrialization and individualism.  Baseball turns into fun 
the oppressions of industry—management, productivity, accounting, specialization, even 
stealing—and yet the pageant of winners and losers in this proto-corporate world also 
allows for goodness to be measured, made immutable, and, thanks to the eternal vigilance 
of statistics, kept alive.  Baseball is a game—some would say a ritual—of hope.  Part of 
that hope lies in the clarity of the sport—a kind of mathematical absoluteness that spills 
over into moral absoluteness, and explains why the fantasy of all-American 
wholesomeness goes with the game like sauerkraut with hot dogs. 
John Lahr, Play at the Plate, NEW YORKER, July 22, 2002, at 80.  Nor should one overlook Justice 
Blackmun’s immortal ode to baseball in the pages of United States Reports or the greatest law 
review article on the sport.  Compare Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64 (1972), with Aside, The 
Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975).  See generally Paul 
Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 239, 239 (1998) (attributing 
American “legal culture” and perhaps even “the very rule of law itself in the United States . . . to our 
national past time [sic]”).  The sheer amount of statistical information on baseball makes it 
impossible for that sport to suffer from the mathematical malaise of Supreme Court analysts.  Cf., 
e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2d ed. 1996) (lamenting how “the absence of reliable data makes it hard to 
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fall on either side of a line dividing all things before the year 1900 from all things 
after.  The first overruling in Supreme Court history took place during the 1830 
Term, and the Court did not overrule decisions in consecutive Terms until 1867 
and 1868.  The 1867 Term, in fact, may be regarded as the beginning of the only 
significant string of Supreme Court overrulings before 1900.  From the 1867 
Term through the 1894 Term, the Court decided twenty-one cases that overruled 
prior decisions; only twice during that stretch did the Court fail to overrule 
precedent in two consecutive Terms.  Quite curiously, the Court then proceeded 
to overrule no decisions in the stretch from the 1895 Term through the 1912 
Term. 
The overruling impulse returned to the Court during the 1913 Term.  Because 
much of the White Court and the pivotal Judiciary Act of 1925 lay ahead, this 
point may be regarded as the beginning of the Supreme Court’s modern approach 
to overrulings.  The Court began to overrule precedent in earnest, though, with 
three overrulings during the 1937 Term.  By the end of the 1943 Term, the Court 
handed down twenty-nine overrulings.  Another comparably intense stretch, from 
the 1962 Term through the 1979 Term bridged the later years of the Warren Court 
with the first years of the Burger Court.  Three of the most active Terms in this 
stretch—the 1962, 1967, and 1975 Terms—coincided with the arrivals of Justices 
Arthur Goldberg, Thurgood Marshall, and John Paul Stevens.  In all, overruling is 
primarily a phenomenon of the twentieth century.164 
William Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice has been one of the less active 
Courts in modern times.  The Stone, Warren, and Burger Courts finished with 
very similar overruling rates: fifteen in five Terms for the Stone Court (3.00 
average), forty-five in sixteen Terms for the Warren Court (2.81) and fifty-two in 
seventeen Terms for the Burger Court (3.05).  The Hughes Court delivered only 
twenty-one overrulings in eleven Terms, but fifteen of those episodes came in its 
final four Terms.  The Vinson Court registered the lowest rate of any post-
Judiciary Act Court, with a mere thirteen overrulings in seven Terms (1.86). 
The Rehnquist Court’s record of overrulings provides little support for 
Professor Merrill’s hypothesis.  By a generous count, it has compiled forty 
overrulings during its first sixteen Terms for an overall average of 2.50 
overrulings per Term.  Twenty-one took place during the “first” Rehnquist Court 
(from October Term 1986 through the end of the 1993 Term); nineteen have 
occurred during the putatively more aggressive Terms since 1994.  Eliminating 
three decisions from the 1998 and 1999 Terms in which the Court did not 
explicitly overrule precedent would reduce the post-1994 tally even further. 
 
understand the Court, the justices, and case decisions”).  Finally, for a compendium linking baseball 
and natural history, the other non-legal leitmotif in this article, see STEPHEN JAY GOULD, TRIUMPH 
AND TRAGEDY IN MUDVILLE: A LIFELONG PASSION FOR BASEBALL (2003). 
 164. See Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 
1980 WIS. L. REV. 467, 467. 
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The most thorough study of the relationship between changes in Supreme 
Court membership and the Court’s propensity to overrule precedent reached this 
conclusion in 1992: “Simply put, when the Supreme Court overturns past rulings, 
it frequently does so precisely because the Court’s composition has changed, 
often dramatically, in a short period.”165  The Hughes, Stone, Vinson, Warren and 
Burger Courts constituted fifty-nine “natural courts” bounded by changes in 
personnel due to retirement or death.  The five most active natural Courts in this 
span—one from each Chief Justice’s administration—accounted for 61 of 146 
overrulings during the fifty-six Terms at issue.  “With the exception of the Vinson 
Court, each . . . of the[se] natural Courts . . . w[as] the product of multiple 
membership changes, sometimes occurring in bunches, that reconstituted the 
preexisting majority on the bench.”166  For its part, the most active natural Court 
during the Vinson period arose from Fred Vinson’s own appointment.167  It 
appears to be the creation of new majorities, not the stabilization of old ones, that 
triggers “a period of constitutional flux and an increasing [willingness to 
question] . . . past constitutional principles.”168 
Like citation counts, the Supreme Court’s record of overrulings affirmatively 
contradicts Professor Merrill’s hypothesis.  Turnover in judicial personnel, far 
from stunting productive cooperation among the Justices, seems to spur doctrinal 
innovation.  The truly tumultuous periods during which the Court produced 
multiple overrulings have all taken place during periods of high, even severe, 
turnover: the late Hughes Court, the early Stone Court, the late Warren Court, and 
the early Burger Court.  Even the relatively reticent Vinson Court delivered 
eleven overrulings during its first three Terms (a time of relative instability) 
before settling for merely two overrulings during its final four Terms (a 
comparatively stable interval).  The second Rehnquist Court has been more 
aggressive than other stable collections of Justices, but even with the deepest 
body of Supreme Court case law in American history as a target, it has not 
approached the propensity of its relatively unstable counterparts to overrule 
precedent. 
V.  WONDERFUL LAW 
Why does stability in judicial personnel correlate so poorly with empirical 
measures of doctrinal dynamism?  Turnover may inspire more productive 
doctrinal change, both in frequency and in intensity, than stability.  At a 
 
 165. Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural Courts 
and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 263 (1992); see also id. (“[W]hen the Court’s 
composition changes dramatically in relatively short time spans, periods of increased reversals of 
prior rulings are likely to result.”). 
 166. Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). 
 167. See id. at 265 n.15. 
 168. Id. at 265-66. 
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minimum, new Justices tend to be younger than their senior counterparts and by 
definition wield less institutional clout.  It is a commonplace in the history of 
science that truly revolutionary discoveries are the province of the young, the 
disaffected, and the excluded.169  There is no reason to imagine that law is 
immune from the inter- and intrapersonal forces that motivate young newcomers 
to shatter old paradigms and forge new ones.  Professor Merrill admits as much 
when the Court’s institutional norms are at stake; he describes the infusion of new 
Justices as the primary engine of “norm change” on the Court.170  Nothing in my 
review of the fossil record suggests that changes in judicial personnel would spur 
institutional evolution but inhibit its doctrinal counterpart.  Judicial instability 
inspires change all the way down. 
Simply put, upheaval spurs creativity.  Even the great defender of monopoly 
power as an engine of invention understood that “creative destruction” spurs 
technological innovation and concomitant economic growth.171  To restate it in 
earthier language: “In Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, 
terror, murder, bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci 
and the Renaissance.  In Switzerland, they had brotherly love; they had 500 years 
of democracy and peace—and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock.”172 
Whatever creative value lurks in stability stems from the relative ease with 
which a fixed set of Justices, over time, can learn strategic behavior.  But the 
types of behavior at issue include the formation of coalitions to block changes.  
Moreover, strategic aptitude may closely track the propensity to hold strong 
ideological convictions.  A robust commitment to one ideology or another may be 
the greatest inhibitor of judicial cooperation.173 
 
 169. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 90, 144 (2d ed. 
1970); MAX PLANCK, SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS 33-34 (Frank Gaynor 
trans., 1949) (“A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making 
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up 
that is familiar with it.”); see also ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY 1 (1967); cf. 
FRANK J. SULLOWAY, BORN TO REBEL: BIRTH ORDER, FAMILY DYNAMICS, AND CREATIVE LIVES 
(1996) (arguing that latecomers rebel rather than conform as a matter of survival and success).  See 
generally HARVEY C. LEHMAN, AGE AND ACHIEVEMENT (1953). 
 170. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 639. 
 171. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 
(1942); CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: BUSINESS SURVIVAL STRATEGIES IN THE GLOBAL INTERNET 
ECONOMY (Lee W. McKnight, Paul M. Vaaler & Raul L. Katz eds., 2001). 
 172. THE THIRD MAN (Lion Int’l Films 1949) (starring Orson Welles as Harry Lime); see also 
Thomas L. Friedman, Cuckoo in Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2002, at A19 (quoting Welles in 
support of the proposition that social instability spurs creativity). 
 173. Paul H. Edelman and I have discussed this phenomenon at great length.  See generally 
Edelman & Chen, supra note 33; Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, “Duel” Diligence: Second 
Thoughts About the Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 219 (1996); Paul H. 
Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1996). 
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Finally, we ignore seemingly personal factors at our peril.  Few, if any, 
Justices would prefer to leave the Court during a period of doctrinal transition.  
The marginal preference for work over leisure must surely be greater under those 
circumstances, no matter whether a Justice contemplating retirement favors or 
opposes the doctrinal shift that is underway.  To the extent this factor has any 
impact, it lends some support for Professor Merrill’s hypothesis.  Old age itself, 
however, points in the opposite direction.  An aging Justice’s time horizon on the 
Court becomes increasingly narrow.  In the quasi-economic jargon of political 
science, each Justice’s discount rate increases with age.  Every repeat-game 
model of the prisoner’s dilemma predicts that cooperation will decrease under 
those circumstances.  As a player’s discount rate rises, he or she derives greater 
benefit from voting personal preferences, relative both to the gains from 
sustaining a past pattern of cooperation and to the costs of potential retaliation for 
defecting. 
I shall name merely one vivid example.  Only in his final Term did Justice 
Blackmun irrevocably repudiate his earliest views on capital punishment174 and  
declare that he would “no longer tinker with the machinery of death.”175  It is 
entirely plausible that Justice Blackmun needed more than two decades to grow 
into this view of the Eighth Amendment, but throughout most of his tenure on the 
Court, he could have created a larger (albeit chronically shorthanded) coalition of 
three Justices who would have declared the death penalty unconstitutional under 
all circumstances.176  That Justice Blackmun nevertheless waited until the cusp of 
his retirement to cement his opposition to the death penalty suggests some 
hesitation during earlier portions of his career not wholly attributable to his lack 
of confidence in his own beliefs. 
Despite finding much evidence contrary to Professor Merrill’s hypothesis, I 
shall refrain from claiming to have discredited it.  One intriguing possibility 
remains.  Changes in judicial personnel may exert opposite, but asymmetrical, 
pressure on the development of legal doctrine.  An “appointment effect” derived 
from the arrival of new Justices may drive doctrinal change, whereas a “stasis 
effect” may arise as each Justice ascertains his or her colleagues’ preferences and 
particular coalitions stabilize.  The evidence I have found suggests that the 
appointment effect is stronger than the stasis effect, but it does not foreclose the 
possibility that the stasis effect may magnify doctrinal change within a narrower 
range of issues on which a majority of Justices can form reliable, stable coalitions.  
The direction for further research on this hypothesis is clear: if Professor Merrill 
 
 174. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“We should 
not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of [the death penalty], or our distaste for [it], to 
guide our judicial decision in [capital] cases . . . .”). 
 175. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.). 
 176. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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has indeed identified a stasis effect, and if I am correct in suggesting that any such 
effect can be overwhelmed by the greater impact of the appointment effect over 
the entire course of Supreme Court history, then evidence of a stasis effect must 
be extracted strictly within other long periods of stability in judicial personnel.  
There may well be other instances in Supreme Court history in which five- and 
six-Justice coalitions prevail across stretches exceeding four Terms, decide a 
greater number of decisions in absolute terms, and dominate an ever greater 
portion of the Court’s docket as those coalitions mature.  Evidence of that sort 
would support Professor Merrill’s hypothesis that a stasis effect does exist and 
can change the jurisprudential course of the Supreme Court. 
Natural history and jurisprudence are both highly complex phenomena; 
neither lends itself to simple explanations.  To be sure, Supreme Court history is 
shorter by multiple orders of magnitude and vastly easier to trace.  All of the 
Court’s published opinions would fit on a DVD-ROM or some other similarly 
portable medium, and more extensive collections reflecting the Justices’ private 
thoughts and deliberations are readily housed in small libraries.  Although it may 
seem absurd to compare efforts to reconcile legal decisions with political forces 
operating upon and within the Court with the dynamics of mass extinctions, legal 
scholars and political scientists do enjoy a more complete, more easily managed 
“fossil record” than that available to their counterparts in the natural sciences.  In 
perhaps one respect, however, we who toil in law and other social sciences may 
face greater difficulty in attributing causation.  No one can seriously assert that the 
extent or diversity of terrestrial life can affect the astronomical clock that metes 
out such appointments as the earth has with comets, asteroids, or meteors.  By 
contrast, intractable debates over whether presidential elections affect abortion 
doctrine at the Supreme Court or whether the Court’s abortion decisions affect 
presidential elections are the stuff of heated cocktail party conversations among 
lawyers, law professors, and their counterparts in the social sciences. 
It is, thus, appropriate that we cannot discern a clear causal connection, if any, 
between the stability of the Supreme Court’s membership and the Justices’ 
propensity to craft aggressive new doctrines.  Professor Thomas Merrill has 
nevertheless formulated an intriguing hypothesis on the strategic behavior of the 
Justices.  His intellectual astrobleme deserves to spark and, one can only hope, 
will spark highly insightful new research.  Devastating events mark several 
celebrated turning points in the legal and political history of the United States.177  
Discrete events and the behavior of legal and political actors are susceptible to 
 
 177. See, e.g., DAVID W. BRADY, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY MAKING 
4 (1988) (documenting “critical elections,” such as those of 1860, 1896, and 1932, that realign 
American politics for decades to come); cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
(1991) (elaborating the notion of “constitutional moments” throughout American legal history). 
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rigorous statistical analysis, even if constitutional law as such is not.178  We may 
eventually develop comprehensive empirical tests of the legal variation on the 
theme of periodicity—the notion that the legal and political history of the United 
States follows repeating cycles.179  Before tackling that daunting task, however, 
we would do well to establish the exact relevance of the stability or volatility of 
the Court’s membership, a variable that hitherto has received little academic 
attention.  Now that Professor Merrill has found a new crater in the Supreme 
Court’s political landscape and defined the second Rehnquist Court accordingly, I 
hope that my modest contribution will represent the first step toward identifying 
comparable judicial epochs throughout Supreme Court history. 
 
 178. See generally, e.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). 
 179. See generally, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1986).  Cf., e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, 
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74 (1955) (“The life cycle of an 
independent commission can be divided into four periods: gestation, youth, maturity, and old age.”); 
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 171 (3d ed. 1972) (“[R]egulatory bodies, 
like the people who comprise them, have a marked life cycle.  In youth they are vigorous, 
aggressive, evangelistic, and even intolerant.  Later they mellow, and in old age . . . they become . . . 
either an arm of the industry they are regulating or senile.”). 
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